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Although the Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic problem is deep-rooted and of long-
standing origins, in the early 1980s, it turned into an armed conflict under the leadership 
of Velupillai Prabahakaran, who had formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam 
(LTTE). The military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 did not end the Sri Lankan ethnic 
problem. Pro-LTTE Tamils, who have migrated and settled in many parts of the world, 
have created many diasporic Tamil organizations to continue their fight for a separate 
state. The LTTE uses the actions of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, the 
Global Tamil Forum, and the British Tamil Forum indirectly to achieve its political 
goal—a Tamil homeland. The Tamil Eelam People’s Assembly as well as ex-combatant 
and intelligence groups continue to adhere to radical ideas of a re-emerging LTTE 
insurgency. Also, the Tamil diaspora is manipulating the Tamil National Alliance and Sri 
Lankan Tamils to achieve its goals. Presently, the UNHCR resolution on alleged war 
crimes by the Sri Lankan military is a major issue among the members of the diaspora, 
who wish to discredit Sri Lanka’s government and military. Since Sri Lanka’s 
independence in 1948, all successive governments have failed to find a solution for the 
demands of the Tamils. The government should encourage all ethnic groups to think of 
Sri Lanka as one nation for the promotion of peaceful coexistence.  
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Although the ethnic problem between the Sinhalese and the Tamils has deep-
rooted and long-standing origins, after Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948, Tamil and 
Sinhala politicians engaged in a bitter dispute over the Tamils’ demand for a separate 
state in the north and east of the island. In the early 1980s, the dispute turned into an 
armed conflict under the leadership of Velupillai Prabahakaran, who formed the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). The military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 did 
not end the Sri Lankan ethnic problem. Pro-LTTE Tamils, who have migrated and settled 
in other parts of the world due to the ethnic problem, have created many diasporic Tamil 
organizations to fight for their demands. The Tamil diaspora’s social and political 
activities have directly impacted the search for solutions to the ethnic problem. Continued 
attempts of the Tamil diaspora to resurrect an insurgency strongly indicate that a Tamil 
separatist ideology still exists. The indirect approaches of the Transnational Government 
of Tamil Eelam, the Global Tamil Forum, and the British Tamil Forum are aimed toward 
achieving the former LTTE’s political goal—a Tamil homeland. The Tamil Eelam 
People’s Assembly as well as the LTTE Headquarters Group continue to adhere to 
radical ideas of a re-emerging LTTE insurgency. These diasporic groups access the local 
Tamil population, especially ex-combatants, with the motive of a Tamil homeland.  
Internally, another major challenge for the government is to work with the Tamil 
National Alliance to find a solution for the Tamil issue without further disturbing the 
coexistence between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. The Tamil diaspora is 
manipulating the Tamil National Alliance to achieve its internal and external goals. The 
representation of the Tamil National Alliance in mainstream Sri Lankan politics has 
become a boon for the diaspora to speak to the world about the alleged wrongdoings of 
the government. The Tamil diaspora supports the Tamil National Alliance’s aspiration—
a separate state—as a cover for its hidden agenda. Conversely, the Tamil diaspora and 
Tamil National Alliance have not given priority to addressing the immediate concerns of 
the Tamil people in the North and East.  
 xvi
Presently, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
resolution on alleged war crimes by the Sri Lankan military is a major concern among the 
members of the diaspora. The Tamil diaspora has capitalized on this issue, especially in 
the United States, Canada, and United Kingdom, to discredit Sri Lanka’s government and 
military. Former President Rajapaksa’s administration failed to effectively handle the 
problem from its inception. The Tamil diaspora gained an advantage through alleging 
war crimes to market its “referendum” of a separate state ideology to the world. The 
present government has done little to address the issue in the countries where the Tamil 
diaspora plays a prominent role. The Sri Lankan government should face the allegation of 
war crimes rather than avoiding them.  
Since Sri Lanka’s independence in 1948, all successive governments have failed 
to find a genuine solution for the demands of the Tamil community. The devolution of 
power for balanced economic growth in the North and South is very critical. As such, the 
government needs to formulate a comprehensive national security strategy that 
encompasses economic and external affairs, security, as well as internal law and order. 
The ethnic problem must be identified as a priority for maintaining peace and harmony in 
Sri Lanka. Furthermore, the government has to prioritize establishing an independent 
commission and devolving power for a lasting solution to the ethnic problem. The 
government should encourage all ethnic groups to think of Sri Lanka as one nation, 
deviating from party politics for the nation to function in a healthy atmosphere of 
coexistence. In order to achieve a more permanent peace, the idea of one Sri Lankan 
national identity must be inculcated into the hearts and minds of children in all 
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In 1976, the Tamil militancy, called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), initiated a struggle for a separate homeland for their Sri Lankan ethnic subgroup. 
On May 18, 2009, after three decades of fighting, the political and the national will 
superseded all other priorities for the nation, and ultimately paved the way to eliminate 
the LTTE from Sri Lanka. However, Sri Lanka is still facing a threat to unity in the 
present post-conflict situation, of which pro-LTTE Tamil diasporic elements are 
disseminating Tamil separatist ideology to discredit the efforts of the government of Sri 
Lanka to bring sustainable peace.1  
The Tamil diaspora presently holds a “dormant posture” because the LTTE has 
ceased to exist. However, the Tamil diaspora continues to use the LTTE name as the 
symbol of the movement to achieve its final objective. In June 2009, Perinbananayakam 
Sivaparan (alias Nediyawan), a zealous follower of the LTTE’s Head of International 
Network, formed the Tamil Eelam People’s Assembly (TEPA)/Tamil National Council 
(TNC) based on the LTTE’s ideology. In addition, Nediyawan’s faction maintains a close 
link with the Global Tamil Forum.2 
Presently, the aspirations of the pro-LTTE diaspora are to make every possible 
attempt to discredit the Sri Lankan government as well as the military for alleged war 
crimes. In addition, the diaspora seeks political autonomy, the declaration of Northern 
and Eastern Sri Lanka as a semi-autonomous Tamil region, and “total separation” from 
the central government in terms of political, socio-economic, military, and education 
constructs.3 Therefore, this study focuses on identifying the Tamil diaspora’s future 
ambitions involved in political and social activities and the future strategy of the 
government in managing the crisis to achieve sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. 
                                                 
1 Sylvester Perera, “The Sri Lankan Civil War: A Personal Reminiscence,” CTX Journal 5 no.4 
(November 2015), https://globalecco.org/the-sri-lankan-civil-war-a-personal-reminiscence-col-sylvester-
perera-sri-lankan-army. 
2 “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network,” accessed 




On February 4, 1948, Sri Lanka, or Ceylon as it was then called, gained its 
independence. The country boasts a religious and cultural heritage that can be traced back 
over a thousand years.4 Most of the current population can date their origins to the 
Aryans of North India or the Dravidians of South India, who arrived on the island around 
500 BCE. Buddhism was introduced on the island around the time of Devanampiya (307–
267 BCE).5 According to their history, the Sinhalese believe that the Tamils were a 
migrant community who arrived from India, the present Tamil Nadu, then the land of 
Sollee. The Tamil king from the Chola Dynasty from South India invaded Ceylon, now 
Sri Lanka, and ruled the country for 44 years, 205–161 BCE. After that time, the kings of 
the Sinhala nation staged several battles against Tamil kings and their forces to chase 
them out of the areas occupied by the Sinhala community. As the current author has 
indicated, the Tamils now claim this area to be the land of Eelam: “Tamils … do not 
believe that they are a migrant community and view the North and East of Sri Lanka as 
their ancestral homeland.”6  
Before independence in 1948, Ceylon was occupied by foreign powers, and the 
land had three different administrative areas—Ruhunu (south), Maya (north) and Pihity 
(central). When the Portuguese arrived in 1505 CE, they found the island divided into 
three kingdoms, two Sinhala kingdoms in the south and the Tamil Kingdom in the north. 
By 1697 CE, the Portuguese ruled the entire island except for the Kandyan kingdom, 
which they could not conquer. The desire to control the spice trade led the Dutch to 
challenge the Portuguese and drive them out of the island by 1658 CE, after which they 
handed over the administration of the island to the Dutch East India Company. At that 
time, the British were worried over the possible takeover of the port of Trincomalee by 
the French and negotiated over the status of the fort. The British slowly forced the Dutch 
                                                 
4 Rohan Gunaratna, War & Peace in Sri Lanka: with a Post-Accord Report from Jaffna (Colombo, Sri 
Lanka: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 1987), 56. Anthropological evidence suggests that human beings 
had first lived on the island some 30,000 years ago at the cave sites of Ratnapura, situated in 
Sabaragamuwa in Sri Lanka.  
5 Ibid., 57. 
6 Perera, “The Sri Lankan Civil War.” 
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off the island by 1795 CE and handed over administration to the British East India 
Company. The British also made determined efforts to conquer the Kandyan kingdom but 
failed. As a result of geographical location, the isolated kingdom developed a distinctive 
identity.7 
The British converted Sri Lanka into a plantation economy, which led to the 
formation of a landed aristocracy, comprising the British and those loyal to them. 
However, the Sinhalese refused to work in the plantation sector, and the British brought 
South-Indian Tamil workers to fulfill their requirements. During this period, Sri Lankan 
cultural beliefs and traditions were neglected by British rulers due to hostilities. After 
independence, attempts were made to reassert Sinhala and Buddhism to a dominant 
position in the society, but these proved severely disruptive.8 
When the British occupiers left in 1948, Tamils, who predominantly occupied the 
north, did not want to be under governance in which a majority of Sinhalese were in 
power. Tamil separatism, which continues to ravage Sri Lanka’s stability, has deep-
rooted and long-standing origins. The present-day crisis is only a manifestation of the 
strained Tamil–Sinhala relations in their pre- and post-independence histories.9 From the 
nineteenth century onward, Tamil and Sinhala historians have engaged in bitter debates 
for and against the demand of the Tamils in the north and the east of the island for a 
homeland. As Sinhala chauvinism rose after independence, Tamil irredentism had no 
choice but to keep pace. After 1956, the “Sinhala only” policy and gradual Sinhala 
colonization of traditional Tamil areas commenced in the north—particularly in 
Vavuniya, Batticaloa, Ampara, and Trincomalee, Sri Lanka.10 The Tamil-majority Jaffna 
peninsula could not prevent the influence of the Tamils in India (Tamil Nadu). The 
                                                 
7 Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: the Role of India’s Intelligence Agencies 
(Colombo, Sri Lanka: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), 55–87. 
8 Janina Brutt-Griffler, “Class, Ethnicity, and Language Rights: An Analysis of British Colonial Policy 
in Lesotho and Sri Lanka and Some Implications for Language Policy,” Journal of Language, Identity, and 
Education 1, no. 3 (2002): 207–234, doi: 10.1207/S15327701JLIE0103_3. 
9 Gunaratna, War & Peace in Sri Lanka, 65. 
10 A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Vancouver, British Columbia: UBC Press, 2000), 84. 
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Tamils failed to gain legitimacy through peaceful satyagraha and hartals (passive 
resistance). Economic desolation and loss of faith in peaceful methods gave a boost to 
violent means. Militants rose to lead the people in these violent means while fighting 
among themselves for predominance and authority.11  
The Sri Lankan geo-strategic situation is a prime factor influencing Sri Lanka’s 
ethnic conflict. Not only is the country located in proximity to its neighbor India, but the 
north and east are only a few miles away from Tamil Nadu, the home of more than 60 
million Tamils. With support from the radical groups of Tamil Nadu, in 1976, Velupillai 
Prabahakeran formed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). Later, the LTTE 
became the largest and most aggressive Tamil guerrilla organization, which depended on 
suicide attacks and an armed culture. Additionally, the LTTE did not intend to create a 
separate state in Sri Lanka but a greater Eelam adjoining to the State of Tamil Nadu in 
India (see Figure 1).12  
   
Figure 1.  Map of Greater Eelam13  
                                                 
11 Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 88–89. 
12 Perera, “The Sri Lankan Civil War.” 
13 Source: Tamil Nadu Liberation Front “Tamil Nadu, Vishal Tamil Nadu, Tamil Desam or Greater 
Tamil Nadu” accessed August 20, 2015. http://truehindu.tripod.com/veerappan.htm. 
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Though the Tamil insurgency died down militarily in 2009, unrest has continued 
to grow under various conditions. The ethnic problem forced an exodus of many Tamils 
to India and rest of the world. They later formed themselves into a Tamil diaspora and the 
world Tamil Forum in an effort to mobilize all Tamils in the world for a common 
purpose. Today, the diaspora is the power behind separatism.14 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
What are the positive and negative impacts on sustainable peace in Sri Lanka 
from the political and social activities of the pro-LTTE members of the Tamil diaspora? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In the present post-conflict situation in Sri Lanka, the government is facing many 
challenges. The Tamil diaspora that is spread all over the world is on the verge of 
promulgating false ideology to discredit the efforts of the Sri Lankan government to bring 
about sustainable peace as a complete solution to its ethnic problem. In his book When 
Counter Insurgency Wins, Ahmed S. Hashim states that the Tamil diaspora “remains a 
politically active and sophisticated force seeking to leverage Western sympathy and 
resources in support of the quest for Eelam.”15 The Tamil political parties who are 
strongly backed by the pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora have failed to cooperate with each 
successive government in Sri Lanka to achieve their demands, which are contradictory to 
the will of the Sri Lanka’s government and Sinhalese ethnic majority. This is the major 
challenge faced by successive governments, internally and internationally. Additionally, 
mistrust has developed between the Tamils and Sinhalese over this period. Even after 
many political discussions, the Tamil diaspora’s political and social activities, the actions 




                                                 
14 Perera, “The Sri Lankan Civil War.” 
15Ahmed Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 211.  
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exaggerated ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka. While analyzing the concerns of all major 
actors, it is necessary to identify the approaches to building confidence among the ethnic 
groups and to find an amicable and lasting solution to the ethnic problem.  
This study is significant for identifying the social and political activities of the 
Tamil diaspora in various countries. Understanding both the positive and negative 
impacts of the political and social activities of the Tamil diaspora will inform how to 
bring about a lasting solution to the ethnic problem. Based on Louis Kriesberg’s conflict 
resolution model, I hope to develop a model for analyzing the Sri Lankan post-conflict 
stuation.16  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although Velupillai Prabakaran and Veerakathy Manivannam (alias Castro)—the 
top leadership of the LTTE—were killed by the Sri Lankan military, the international 
network of the LTTE still actively safeguards the interest of the Tamil diaspora. Although 
no single person is now in charge, a web of key individuals living in Western and 
European countries (see Table 1) continues to create political groups and facilitate 
coordinating centers to revamp and fund the network.17 It is against this backdrop that the 





                                                 
16 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007), 23. 
17 Udeshi Amarasinghe, “Modus Operandi: Tamil diaspora and LTTE Organizations,” Official 
Government News Portal of Sri Lanka Accessed August 11, 2015. http://www.news.lk/fetures/item/1084-
modus-operandi-tamil-diaspora-and-ltte-organisations. 
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Table 1.   Distribution of Tamil Diaspora18 
Serial Country Tamil Diaspora 
1 Canada 380,000 
2 India  150,000 
3 Great Britain 300,000 
4 Germany 60,000 
5 Australia 40,000 
6 Switzerland 42,000 
7 France 100,000 
8 Netherlands 15,000 
9 United States 35,0000 
10 Italy 23,000 
11 Malaysia 20,000 
12 Norway 12,000 
13 Denmark 7,000 
14 New Zealand 3,000 
15 Sweden 2,500 
16 Belgium 800 
17 Finland 700 
 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on literature identifying the Tamil diaspora’s past 
and present political and social activities as well as the future strategy of the government 
in managing the crisis to achieve sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. 
1. Origin of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
The LTTE is known in history as one of the most ruthless terrorist organizations; 
the group controlled enough territory in Sri Lanka to become a de facto state with its own 
army, navy, and police, to include an air force equipped with light aircraft. In addition, 
                                                 
18 “Evolution of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) International Network,” accessed 
September 20, 2015, http://www.defence.lk/news/pdf/LTTE%20International%20Network.pdf. 
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the LTTE owned a shipping line that ferried arms and ammunition to its fighting 
elements when it was not legitimately trading in cargo.19 
Vast literature exists on the LTTE organization, covering its origins, recruitment 
methods, training, equipment, and the various roles it played. However, this study does 
not focus on details of the organization. It is of paramount importance to know about the 
relationship between the LTTE organization and the Tamil diaspora as it is directly 
related to this thesis. In Tigers Vanquished, M. R. Narayan Swamy claims that the LTTE 
was formed in 1976. As the leader of the organization, Vellupillai Prabhakaran played a 
key role in gaining maximum support from the Tamil diaspora. Initially, he assassinated 
many political and contemporary leaders of Tamil militant groups to become the sole 
representative of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Swamy writes, “After initial setbacks, 
Prabhakaran became the LTTE, and the LTTE became Prabhakaran.”20 The current 
author’s personal experience coincides with Swamy’s book and is of particular use in 
formulating this thesis. The 1983 “Black July” riots constituted the biggest blunder by the 
extremist Sinhalese people in the south and created an opportunity for Prabhakaran to 
rebuild his organization. Previously, none of these Tamil militant groups that emerged in 
the northern part of Sri Lanka along with the LTTE had been able to muster anything 
more than twenty members. The LTTE had neither a well-timed program nor a 
systematic approach to build up its organization. In other words, the Tamil militancy, 
which waged a struggle for a separate homeland in Sri Lanka for over thirty years, had an 
accidental birth. 
Along with the Tamil diaspora, the involvement of the international community in 
the Sri Lankan conflict extended worldwide, and an unfavorable situation arose in India. 
According to Swamy, until 1983, the state of Tamil Nadu (a southern state in India) 
unofficially and covertly provided support to the Tamils; limited ammunition, arms, and 
equipment were provided to the LTTE. Following the 1983 riots, however, India overtly 
gave support by giving up some of its territories to organize and prepare itself for an 
                                                 
19 M. R. Narayan Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s Story (New Delhi, India: SAGE 
Publications, 2010), xix. 
20 Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished, 137. 
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armed struggle.21 This study agrees with Swamy’s analysis of the Indian Research and 
Analysis Wing (RAW): India, being an ally of the socialist camp during the Cold War, 
played the role of external agency and enabled a proxy war in Sri Lanka. This seems to 
be the reason why the new government of Sri Lanka aligned with the West. India 
suspected the Sri Lankan government was adopting capitalistic policies, including North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategies, led by the United States. Subsequently, 
India tried to intervene in curbing militancy but had to face disastrous consequences, 
losing a large number of soldiers and a former prime minister to assassination.  
Thereafter, India became a prominent figure in the international community over 
the Sri Lankan conflict. In this thesis, the current author discusses world opinion, India’s 
foreign policy with Sri Lanka, and the agreements signed between the two governments 
to find a lasting solution to the ethnic issue. 
2. What Is a Diaspora? 
According to Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, “Diasporas are social groups that (i) 
settle and establish themselves in another country and (ii) are internally heterogeneous.”22 
Smith and Stares also explain that globalization has created a situation in which diasporas 
can play a significant role in a conflict. They are considered an important international 
political force, whose most significant characteristic is the variety of different roles they 
are liable to play in the conflict. Within the same conflict, the approaches of various 
individuals, groups, and their organizations differ and may contribute positively or 
negatively toward a continued conflict. Therefore, they can be peacemakers or peace-
wreckers. These roles can best be understood by tracing their capacities and transnational 
opportunities.23 In the Sri Lankan conflict, the identification and understanding of 
diaspora activities are critical to achieving sustainable peace. In this thesis, the author 
employs the aforementioned definition and the roles played by the Tamil diaspora.  
                                                 
21 Ibid., ivi. 
22 Hazel Smith and Paul B. Stares, Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (New 
York: United Nations Publications, 2007), 5. 
23 Smith and Stares, Diasporas in Conflict, 9. 
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3. The Tamil Diaspora—Who Are They? 
According to Christine Fair, the Tamil diaspora consists of many waves of 
migration since the British colonial period (1797–1948). During the British occupation, 
Tamils who were fluent in English migrated to Burma and the Federated Malay States for 
government job opportunities. Then, in 1956, after the government introduced a “Sinhala 
only” policy, a few thousand educated Tamils left Sri Lanka and settled in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United States. Also, according to Fair, due to 
undesirable political situations that existed from time to time in Sri Lanka, some Tamil 
people were compelled to migrate.24 Fair’s claim is accurate in that the Tamils migrated 
after independence purely on ethnic grounds. However, this study proposes that it was 
after the 1983 riots that the majority of Tamils left the country, both legally and illegally. 
These migrants initially maintained refugee status, demanding political asylum in Europe 
and Northern America. Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah confirms the UNHCR’s report that 
from 1980 to 1990, 256,307 Tamil Sri Lankans demanded asylum in Europe.25 
Subsequently, the majority of them obtained permanent residence in many countries 
around the world. Accordingly, the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora increased from 600,000 to 
800,000 persons worldwide and started political and social activities in which it sought 
division in Sri Lanka.26 
Although there were about seventy-five million Tamil people in the world, none 
of the authors discuss the Tamil diaspora before 1983. Historically, the Tamil people are 
from South Asia, the majority of them living in the southern parts of India and the 
northern parts of Sri Lanka. However, many claim that the Tamil diaspora came into 
existence after the 1983 riots in Sri Lanka. In the same vein, Narayan Swamy says that 
the riots on July 23, 1983 riots were the turning point of the ethnic problem in Sri 
                                                 
24 C. Christine Fair, “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora: Sustaining Conflict and Pushing for Peace,” in 
Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers, ed. Hazel Smith and Paul B. Stares (New York: 
United Nations University Press, 2007), 172–195. 
25 Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, “Tamil diaspora Politics,” in Encyclopedia of diasporas (New York: 
Springer, 2005), 493. 
26 Ibid., 179. 
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Lanka.27 It is necessary to understand what actually happened during the riots. According 
to Hashim, July 23, 1983 was the worst recorded day in Sri Lankan history, when 
community riots began and spread quickly all over the country. These riots occurred in 
response to an incident during which the LTTE ambushed and killed a Sri Lankan Army 
officer and twelve other rankers at Tirunelveli, Jaffna (a city adjacent to Jaffna, the main 
city of northern Sri Lanka). This was the major blunder made by the Sinhalese extremists 
in Sri Lanka. Even the government was unable to effectively control the situation. The 
LTTE and the Tamil diaspora have repeatedly used the 1983 incident to justify their 
cause of separate statehood.28 The riot is one of the important incidents that relates to this 
thesis. 
The entire Tamil diaspora does not work as a pro-LTTE element struggling to 
create a separate state in Sri Lanka. According to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, the 
“present LTTE/Pro-LTTE international network can be broadly categorized into five 
groups.”29 Visvanathan Rudrakumaran, LTTE militant and the international legal head of 
the LTTE in the United States, is constantly working toward establishing the 
“government in exile,” the Transnational Government for Tamil Eelam (TGTE). 
Perinbananayakam Sivaparan (alias Nediyawan) formed a radical group known as the 
Tamil Eelam People’s Assembly (TEPA)/Tamil National Council (TNC) to perpetuate 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran’s ideology and tactics. Rev. Fr. S. J. Emmanuel continues to lead 
the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), and Segarapaillai Vinayagamoorthy (aliases Vinayagam 
and Arivalagan) founded the LTTE Headquarters Group in the early part of 2010. Apart 
from these, Suren Surendriran heads the British Tamil Forum (BTF) based in the United 
Kingdom. According to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, “Though the role, task and 
policies of these groups, invariably overlapped, all these group are working towards a 
                                                 
27 Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished, 12–19. 
28 Ruwan M. Jayatunge, “The Black July 1983 that Created a Collective Trauma,” Lankaweb, April 
27, 2010, http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2010/04/27/the-black-july-1983-that-created-a-collective-
trauma/. 
29 “Evolution of Liberation Tigers,” Ministry of Defense. 
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common agenda of establishing a separate state.”30 Therefore, this study incorporates 
only these five factions, and people who are involved with these five factions are 
identified as the pro-LTTE diaspora. 
4. Eelam Wars and the Tamil Diaspora 
The Tamil diaspora is one of the key factors for the existence of the LTTE 
organization that had ruthlessly fought for more than three decades before it was 
vanquished. In line with the previous authors, Stephen L. Battle discusses the 
involvement and contribution made to the LTTE organization during various stages of the 
conflict. According to Battle, since 1983, the Tamil diaspora has raised its voice in the 
international arena and lobbied for international sympathy and support in the form of 
financing and materiel for the war effort. By 1998, the Tamil diaspora contributed 
twenty-four to thirty-six million USD to the LTTE, and this figure increased yearly.31 In 
the latter stages of the conflict, the contribution reached $200–$300 million USD 
annually.32 Fair supports this argument and categorizes the diaspora’s contribution into 
four aspects: economic, political, military, and socio-cultural. She also identifies the 
Tamil diaspora as the “economic backbone of the militant campaign.”33 In the current 
author’s view, the LTTE had the capacity to combat the Indian Army in Sri Lanka to an 
extent. Therefore, the LTTE was able to convince Tamil expatriates living abroad both in 
refugee status and otherwise that it was prepared to achieve its desired goal through an 
armed struggle. In the meantime, the LTTE engaged in various propaganda campaigns 
for two causes.34 The first was to justify demands for political asylum and citizenship. 
The second was to support the separatist struggle in Sri Lanka.  
In 2007, the Sri Lankan government began the final offensives against the LTTE. 
The operation began after both parties failed to negotiate a settlement during the fifth 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
 
31 Stephen L. Battle, “Lessons in Legitimacy: The LTTE End-game of 2007–2009” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 25. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Fair, “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora,” 181. 
34 “Evolution of Liberation Tigers,” Ministry of Defense. 
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round of peace negotiations. In his book, Swamy argues that Selvarasa Pathmanathan 
(aliases Kumaran Pathmanathan or KP), the successor of the late Anton Balasingham and 
newly appointed head of the international relations department, made every possible 
attempt to stop ongoing operations. He was under the impression that the LTTE 
organization was going to be defeated by the Sri Lankan military. However, the Sri 
Lankan government did not adequately disrupt the LTTE’s established links with the 
West and Europe through the Tamil diaspora. The LTTE expected assistance from the 
West and Europe in the form of diplomatic interference during the final phase of 
operations to gain time.35 Having failed to get support before the LTTE was vanquished, 
the Tamil diaspora has made all possible attempts to discredit the government and 
security forces over the issue of casualties and deaths during the final battle.36 Therefore, 
the author, using conflict resolution models (outlined in following sections), explores the 
ways and means to address the postwar conflict between the government of Sri Lanka 
(GoSL) and the Tamil diaspora. 
Although the GoSL eliminated the terror outfit completely from Sri Lanka, many 
scholars have argued that Sri Lanka still faces a threat to unity in the present post-conflict 
situation. Hashim, for example, argues that though the shooting war in Sri Lanka has 
terminated, the conflict has not. 37 The current author agrees with these scholars and 
argues this claim later in the thesis. In fact, after 2009, few incidents occurred in Sri 
Lanka that were related to the remnants of LTTE. In an article for the Daily Mirror on 
April 19, 2014, D.B.J. Jeyaraj recounts an incident of LTTE resurgence by three ex-
LTTE activists, who were funded and motivated by pro-LTTE diaspora elements. 
However, they were killed by the Sri Lankan Army in Vedivaithakallu in the Northern 
Province in April 2014.38 In the meantime, according to Chanaka Bandarage, a United 
Nations (UN) resolution was passed against the government of Sri Lanka over alleged 
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war crimes. The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) is understood to be 
the driving force behind this resolution that alleges  the Sri Lankan Army violated human 
rights at the UNHCR sessions in 2012, 2013, and 2014.39 Consequently, the TGTE 
planned to remove the generalized system of preferences (GSP) and tax concessions for 
the European Union (EU)’s garment exports. The diplomatic isolation at the 
Commonwealth sessions was another negative issue for the government of Sri Lanka due 
to the involvement of the TGTE in Sri Lankan affairs.40 According to Henry Ridgwell, in 
2013, the heads of state of Canada and India among others refrained from participating in 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM).41 Notably, in addition to 
affecting world leaders, the TGTE is on the verge of strengthening the Tamil National 
Alliance (TNA) as the sole representative of Tamil people in Sri Lanka. Later chapters 
describe in detail how the TGTE poses a threat to Sri Lanka’s economy, security, 
territorial integrity, and sovereignty.  
5. South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and Creation 
of South Sudan  
On July 9, 2011, independence was declared in South Sudan. In 1983, Sudanese 
President Gaafar Nimeiry declared all Sudan, including the southern region, an Islamic 
state and governed by Sharia law. However, the enforcement of Islamic and Arabic 
identity on the South Sudanese people was rejected by the non-Islamic majority 
inhabiting the region. The mistrust between North and South Sudan began, and South 
Sudanese autonomy was blocked. As a result, rebel groups emerged to fight for 
independence against the Sudanese government.42 They fought for decades, and an 
estimated 2.5 million people died in the conflict while another four million were 
                                                 
39 Chanaka Bandarage,”UNHCR Sessions in Geneva in March 2014,” Lankaweb, January 13, 2014, 
http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2014/01/13/unhrc-sessions-in-geneva-in-march-2014/. 
40 “Sri Lanka Hardens Stand on GSP Plus,” Tamil Guardian, October 29, 2008, 
http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=1959. 
41 Henry Ridgwell, “Some Boycott Sri Lanka Commonwealth Meeting,” Voice of America, November 
11, 2013, http://www.voanews.com/content/some-boycott-sri-lanka-commonweath-meeting/1788057.html. 
42 “Behind the Red Line: Political Repression in Sudan,” Human Rights Watch, May 1996, 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Sudan.htm. 
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displaced.43 Subsequently, in January 2011, in accordance with a comprehensive peace 
agreement (CPA) at a referendum held on the independence of South Sudan, nearly 99 
percent of South Sudanese voted in favor of an independent state, that is, not to be 
annexed by Sudan.44 Even after the declaration of a separate state, the conflict remained 
unresolved. 
The comparison between Sri Lanka and South Sudan is problematic due to 
different geographies, societies, and cultures. Shenali D. Waduge also argues against the 
comparison, stating that as opposed to the South Sudanese, the Tamils are not living 
confined to North and East Sri Lanka but scattered all over the island along with other 
communities. Additionally, the Tamils live in peace and harmony with the majority 
Sinhalese in the rest of the country.45 Confirming Waduge’s argument, the total Tamil 
population in Sri Lanka is 3,113,247, out of which only 1,597,276 reside in the North and 
East.46 Therefore, Waduge claims that the Tamil diaspora’s demand for a separate state in 
Sri Lanka, referring to the referendum that created South Sudan, is invalid.47 Also, the 
total area of Sudan (before separation) is forty times bigger than Sri Lanka. 48 This 
aforementioned data will be considered when analyzing the demand of the Tamil 
diaspora for a separate state.  
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) is important to 
this study because the Sri Lankan government refers to this as a model for bringing a 
solution to its post-conflict tensions. Equivalent to a full-fledged court, the TRC was 
established by the South African government in 1995 to help its people in their 
                                                 
43 “Ongoing Displacement and Conflict despite Independence,” last modified February 5, 2015, 
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47 Waduge, “Sri Lankan Tamils Learn Lessons.” 
48 Ibid.  
 16
reconciliation and to uncover the truth about human rights violations. Along the same 
line, in a CNN interview, former Sri Lankan High Commissioner to the United Kingdom 
(UK) Chris Nonis explains the main purpose of this implementation was to gather facts 
from both victims and perpetrators of apartheid but not to pursue punitive actions for past 
offenses.49 Therefore, this commission differs from other commissions like the 
Nuremberg trials in which Nazis were prosecuted for crimes against humanity after 
World War II.50 President Maithripala Sirisena highlighted the South African model to 
find a solution to the Sri Lankan tensions because an important feature of the TRC was its 
openness and transparency.51 The current author discusses the TRC and analyzes the 
president’s manifesto together with Lesson Learnt and Reconciliation Commission 
(LLRC) recommendations made during former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s regime.  
6. Louis Kriesberg’s Model of Conflict Cycle 
There are different models that attempt to explain the relationship between 
conflict and peace. It is extremely difficult, however, to identify an exact model for the 
Sri Lankan conflict because the situation is unique. Hence, I will discuss Kriesberg’s 
model related to the subject from escalation to resolution. I will compare and contrast the  
details and ideas of this model to create a new model that suits the analysis of the Sri 
Lankan situation.  
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Figure 2.  Conflict Cycle52 
Louis Kriesberg’s model for the constructive conflict from escalation to 
resolution, shown in Figure 2, gives a comprehensive explanation as to the causes of 
diverse social conflicts. Kriesberg gives a series of stages for the base emergence of a 
conflict, which includes various factors. Initially, a conflict begins when one party tries to 
manifest the belief that his goal of conflict is incompatible with that of his adversary’s. In 
another case, the adversary tries to pursue another incompatible goal. This sort of 
thinking expresses the desire of one adversary to go against the other. Thus, the 
escalation of a conflict can exist. According to Kriesberg, these conflicts are liable to 
escalate or de-escalate on a time frame and can vary in magnitude. Finally, the outcome 
may be a total termination. The re-emergence of a fresh conflict cannot be ruled out, 
according to Kriesberg, who introduces a cycle of events. Moreover, environmental 
factors can cause another conflict to re-emergence.53 
According to the Kreisberg conflict cycle, not all stages of conflicts are identical 
or follow in the same sequence. However, the current conflict cycle gives a method for 
understanding the mode of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict, and it also helps the 
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adversaries make policies and recommendations to settle the dispute. In Figure 2, short 
arrows indicate the external (the Tamil diaspora) and internal (the TNA) factors based on 
the respective adversaries. The author considers that Sri Lanka is in the reconciliation 
process after many the escalations and de-escalations over three decades. Presently, the 
government considers the Tamil diaspora and the TNA its main adversaries in either the 
peaceful or violent outcome. Also, according to Kreisberg, a relationship can be 
identified by considering conflicting and complementary interests. Therefore, the current 
author uses Kriesberg’s theory in the analysis to identify complementary and conflicting 
interests of the Tamil diaspora, the TNA, and the government of Sri Lanka against their 
respective opponents. Kreisberg contends that integration advisory is the best method to 
bring about solutions to social problems. Therefore, final recommendations consider how 
best to integrate the Tamil diaspora and the TNA into the administration while defending 
the interests of the government.54  
7. SWOT Analysis 
In the past, SWOT analysis has been a method to assess strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats in business and industries. The use of SWOT analysis in 
community work is also employed to combat its internal and external adversaries. 
However, after identifying the objective or end state, SWOT analysis can also be used to 
make decisions in non-profit organizations, including governments. Furthermore, this 
analysis can be used in pre-crisis planning and preventive crisis management. Hence, the 
author uses SWOT analysis to identify the negative and positive impacts of the Tamil 
diaspora in achieving sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. Then, the author gives 
recommendations based on analysis to counter threats, overcome weaknesses, exploit 
opportunities, and maximize the strengths of the government in finding a lasting solution 
to the ethnic problem.55 The elements used in Chapter IV’s analysis are shown in Figure 
3. 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 138. 
55 David Jacobsen, Paul Eggen, and Donald Kauchak, Methods for Teaching: A Skills Approach (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). 
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Figure 3.  SWOT Analysis56 
8. The Demands of the Tamil National Alliance and the Government’s 
Proposals 
In this thesis, the author has collected and analyzed information in detail on the 
demand of the main Tamil political party, the TNA, which is primarily linked to the 
Tamil diaspora. In this regard, the author focuses primarily on the objectives considered 
by the Sri Lankan government in terms of the 13th Amendment “13 plus dialogue” and 
the recommendations of the LLRC report.  
The TNA, based on conflict resolution in the present context, has demanded “the 
right of self-determination[,] … merged …northern and eastern provinces based on a 
federal structure[,] … devolution of power[,] … direct foreign investment in the north-
east[, and] … avenues for a tertiary education”57 On these issues, the Sri Lankan 
government has held sessions on several occasions, considering a justifiable resolution to 
counter the demands of the TNA. The 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka 
                                                 
56 Source: Wikipedia, s.v. “SWOT analysis,” last modified September 30, 2007. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SWOT_en.svg. 
57 “Our Stand on the Political Solution,” accessed August 23, 2015. http://tnapolitics.org/?page_id=33.  
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was created to give powers to the provincial councils. The amendment made Sinhala and 
Tamil the official languages on July 29, 1987. Subsequently, on November 14, 1987, the 
Sri Lankan parliament passed the 13th Amendment to the 1978 Constitution, and 
Provincial Council Act 42 of 1987 was established. Prior to the end of the conflict, 
former President Mahinda Rajapakse held a dialogue on the “13 plus” with the authorities 
of the Indian government.58 Consequently, the intervention of the Tamil diaspora, 
supported by the TNA, brought the matter to higher levels, and the matter was taken up 
for discussion at the UNHCR sessions in 2012, 2013, and 2014. However, the 
implementation of the LLRC’s recommendations by the government of Sri Lanka is 
continuing through the National Plan of Action (NPoA).59 
The main demand of the TNA on the 13th Amendment, as supported by the 
Indian government, is critical because of the reluctance of full implementation by the 
previous government. With the formation of the new government, the subject of conflict 
resolution is considered a vital issue to be addressed immediately.  
E. CONCLUSION  
The LTTE waged a continuous war against seven successive governments in Sri 
Lanka. Although it was militarily defeated in May 2009, its separatist ideology has 
continued to sustain the Tamil diaspora and has become a serious threat to the economy, 
security, and sovereignty of Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora’s separatist ideology shares 
common features with the diasporas in other world conflicts and shows connections 
between different stages in the conflicts and their outcomes. The Tamil diaspora’s 
political and social activities as well as its networking, therefore, stand unique among 
other global conflicts since there exists no historical legitimacy. 
The challenge is to preserve Sri Lankan territorial integrity and continue with the 
integration process of ethnic groups without damaging the sovereignty of the state. 
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Therefore, it is essential to study existing literature that identifies the demands of Tamils 
in Sri Lanka along with the influences, activities, and aspirations of the Tamil diaspora. 
Then, the thesis analyzes the findings with proposals and existing agreements of the Sri 
Lankan government. Finally, the thesis gives recommendations toward finding a lasting 
solution to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. A systematic study of this situation, therefore, 
is of immense use to the state machinery that strives to counter these challenges. Thus, 
the author focuses on developing a future strategy for managing the crisis through the Sri 
Lankan government working with the Sri Lankan military to achieve sustainable peace in 
the country. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
This study specifies and offers critical insight into secondary literature that has 
been written by eminent scholars, academicians, writers, researchers, think tanks, and 
journals of eminent institutions and organizations. Extensive use of the Internet has also 
been undertaken to supplement and update the research. The author cannot gain access to 
pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora or members of the TNA to obtain first-hand information. 
Therefore, the author will focus on the following methodology: 
 Though the Pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora has spread in many countries 
throughout the world, the author focuses on social and political activities 
of the Tamil diaspora solely in the United States, Canada, and the UK. The 
research discusses the detailed political and social activities of five pro-
LTTE Tamil diaspora groups, namely, the Transnational Government of 
Tamil Eelam (TGTE), the Tamil Eelam People’s Assembly (TEPA), the 
Global Tamil Forum (GTF), the British Tamil Forum (BTF), and the  
forner combatant/intelligence group. Additionally, this study focuses on 
the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil National Alliance, which is 
considered the main political representative of the Tamil diaspora.  
 The study, then, analyzes the social and political activities of the Tamil 
diaspora and the stance of the Sri Lankan government, using the 
conceptual model developed from Kreisberg’s literature and SWOT 
analysis. The research identifies respective conflicting and complementary 
interests of the Tamil diaspora, the TNA, and the government against their 
respective adversaries and, then, identifies strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats to the Sri Lankan government. Finally, the 
author identifies the negative and positive impacts of the Tamil diaspora in 
the reconciliation process as the outcome of the analysis.  
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 This study also incorporates the issue of the South Sudan referendum and 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report in the 
discussion and the analysis of the Tamil diaspora’s the and TNA’s 
interests.  
 Finally, the study provides recommendations for a lasting solution to the 
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, based on elements of national power: 
diplomacy, information and technology, military, and economy (DIME). 
Thus, the author focuses on developing a future strategy for the Sri 
Lankan government to manage the ethnic conflict and achieve sustainable 
peace in Sri Lanka.  
  
 23
II. THE TAMIL DIASPORA’S ORGANIZATIONS AND GLOBAL 
ACTIVITIES, THE STANCE OF SRI LANKA, AND THE TAMIL 
NATIONAL ALLIANCE 
This chapter focuses on identifying the current political and international network 
of the pro–Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) Tamil diaspora, its political and 
social activities, and its objectives as well as the government’s future strategy to manage 
the crisis to achieve sustainable peace in Sri Lanka. The perspectives of the Tamil 
diaspora and the Tamil National Alliance, the leading Tamil political party in Sri Lanka, 
are crucial in achieving a lasting solution in Sri Lanka; thus, an understanding of the 
potential post-conflict situation in Sri Lanka and the identification of its significant 
challenges are an important part of this chapter.  
A. THE TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL EELAM  
The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) was formed in the United 
States in 2010 by a group among the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora with the intention of 
creating a separate state within Sri Lanka. Visvanathan Rudrakumaran, a close associate 
of the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabahakaran, is the Prime Minister of the Transnational 
Government. The TGTE has established offices in most European countries where the 
Tamil diaspora resides, maintaining a close connection with Tamil political action 
groups. Its goal is the creation of a separate state, Tamil Eelam, in Sri Lanka. 
Rudrakumaran has begun to establish close links with the Tamil diaspora and its other 
organizations in the world. In 2010, the TGTE had its first election to select 135 members 
its so-called “parliament.” However, during the election, over eighty-five percent of the 
Tamil voters refrained from voting. Subsequently, only one-third of the loyal members 
voted for the prime minister (PM) and the ministers. Rudrakumaran’s policies were not 
acceptable to the rival party leader of another faction called the Tamil Coordinating 
Committee (TCC), another ideologue who opted to remain independent in order to grab 




Tamil diaspora, especially to those who did not accept Rudrakumaran’s role in the group. 





Figure 4.  The Organization of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam60  
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The mission statement of the TGTE is quoted as follows: 
The Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam is a political formation to 
win the freedom of the Tamil people on the basis of their fundamental 
political principles of Nationhood, Homeland and Right of self-
determination. At present, the Tamil people have absolutely no prospect of 
articulating their political aspirations or of exercising their fundamental 
rights in their homeland itself. The Sri Lankan government, through legal 
impediments, military occupation and murder is strangling the Tamil 
people’s aspirations and their political rights.61 
On the TGTE’s official website, the organization lists its objectives. The 
following is a brief description of each: 
 Coordinating all Tamil groups to achieve the Tamil political aspirations 
embedded in the 1977 mandate of the Vaddukoddai Resolution and 
Thimpu Principles;  
 Advocating to achieve aspirations to regain “sovereignty and right to self-
determination, articulated by the Tamil leadership”;62  
 “Articulating positions for negotiations with the Sinhala nation”; 63 
 “Establishing direct links with foreign Governments and other 
international organizations”;64 
 “Working for the social, economic and cultural well-being of more than 
one million members of the Tamil Diaspora”;65 
 “Building a political program with the participation of Muslim 
representatives, taking into account that the diversity of Tamil and Muslim 
regions has been used as a threat in the past against the realization of the 
Tamils’ right to self-determination”;66  
 “In the case of promoting the interest of the Tamil people living in the 
North and East of Sri Lanka and the diaspora, liaising with international 
non-governmental organizations to ensure the physical survival and safety 
from physical abuse of Tamil children and ensuring the reuniting of the 
                                                 







family members separated during the conflict. Another concern is ensuring 
the return of the thousands of Tamils held in camps in their homes and 
obtaining justice for those who have committed genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.”67 
In 2015, the TGTE orchestrated a worldwide postcard campaign calling for the 
release of Sri Lankan Tamil prisoners connected to the armed conflict that ended in 2009. 
Over 200 Tamil have been held as postwar detainees in Sri Lankan prisons. Some of 
them have been in the prisons for over 12 years without any formal charge. These 
prisoners went on hunger strikes on two occasions, October 12, 2012 and November 7, 
2015. The Sri Lankan government later reassured that their cases would be considered 
and heard without much delay. Given this assurance, the prisoners suspended their 2015 
hunger strike. By this time, some of the POWs had fallen badly ill. They resumed their 
hunger strike again on December 15, 2015 as the government had not kept its promise. 
The TGTE feels that the Sri Lankan government should honor its promises given to the 
POWs, which was the reason the previous hunger strike was suspended.68 
The latest campaign of the TGTE centered on demanding justice for Tamils 
allegedly killed in Sri Lanka during the conflict. The TGTE favors imposing penalties on 
the Sri Lankan government through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), and has gone to the extent of meeting Prince Zeid, the head of the UNHCR, to 
voice its appreciation for his bold decision in appointing a special hybrid court to conduct 
an inquiry. To publicize its efforts, the TGTE declared a “Tamil National Day of 
Mourning” to coincide with the opening of the 30th session of the UNHCR in Geneva, 
which concluded on May 18, 2016, the seventh anniversary of the TGTE. The TGTE 
chose these dates to emphasize its struggle for justice against the purported Tamil 
annihilation by Sri Lanka. The TGTE took this action because it was not confident about 
the domestic investigation proposed by the Sri Lankan government. The organization has 
also dedicated a separate team of international judges, lawyers, and human rights 
67 Amarasinghe, “Modus Operandi.” 
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specialists to monitor the proceedings in Sri Lanka. Also, TGTE officials have requested 
that the commissioner turn over evidence available for prosecution under universal 
jurisdiction.69 It seems that Sri Lanka is still facing a challenge from separatist groups in 
the post-conflict situation, whereby the TGTE is making strong attempts to propagate its 
Tamil ideology while discrediting the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) on alleged human 
right violations, which are analyzed in Chapter III. Also, the TGTE is currently engaged 
in many political and social activities to influence the West and European countries to 
implement the UNHCR resolutions against the GoSL. 
The TGTE’s overall objective, however, is to achieve a “Tamil homeland and 
self-determination.”70 The TGTE strongly advocates for implementing self-determination 
based on the Vaddukoddai Resolution headed by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam of the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF) on May 14, 197671 as well as the Thimpu Talks held on 
July 13, 1985, which established the main criteria of all the deliberations and declarations 
with regard to a separate nation for Tamils in Sri Lanka.72 The TGTE disseminates its 
propaganda worldwide, targeting youth segments to achieve its strategic objective.73 
Although the LTTE was militarily defeated, the TGTE stands for the same ideology of a 
separate state in Sri Lanka through its various social and political activities. From its 
actions, it seems evident that the TGTE has not given up the radical ideology of the 
LTTE’s late leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, provoking the Tamil community in Sri 
Lanka. The LTTE’s strategy to accomplish this, however, failed with tragic consequences 
over the last three decades. Therefore, Chapter III explores how the Sri Lankan 
government can best influence the diaspora to abandon its ideology of separatism.  
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The TGTE’s other main goal is to discredit the Sri Lankan government and its 
military. The TGTE claims that the Sri Lankan state itself stands accused of genocide 
against the Tamils. The interesting highlights of the aforementioned areas are published 
on the TGTE’s website and in the mass media. These accusations criticize the Sri Lankan 
government of diluting the alleged human rights violations; Sri Lankan Northern 
Provincial Council Chief Minister Vigneshvaran and the Tamilnadu government both 
favor the TGTE’s stance. Rajavarothiam Sampanthan’s alignment with the government 
agenda while serving as the leader of the opposition party, the Tamil National Alliance 
(TNA), seems questionable. The implementation of the UNHCR resolution has also been 
included in the TNA’s list of tasks to accomplish.74  Chapter III explores finding different 
views to approach reasonable and amicable resolutions that are acceptable to both parties. 
B.  THE GLOBAL TAMIL FORUM   
In February 2010, the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) was formed for the cause of 
Eelam, coordinating and rallying all of the Tamil diaspora’s factions that struggled for 
justice against the Sri Lankan military’s alleged war crimes. The GTF is an organization 
allegedly in control of over 15 pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora groups around the globe. Rev. 
Fr. S. J. Emmanuel, a close associate of LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran, was 
appointed as head of the GTF because he was a religious dignitary and the candidate 
most trusted by the international community due to his intellectual and religious 
credentials. The GTF followed the approach of another group called the British Tamil 
Forum (BTF) in the United Kingdom (UK), which exercises power by influencing key 
political parties through a few local politicians in parliament. Both the GTF and the BTF 
work closely with two other LTTE fronts, the Tamil for Conservative Party (TCP) and 
Tamils for Labor Party (TLP), which have worked closely in lobbying political support in 
the UK, Europe, and other Western countries. Today, the GTF plays a critical role in 
uniting all other LTTE groups under one umbrella to establish a separate state while also 
creating an environment conducive to radical groups continuing their operations. The 
GTF critically sidelines human-rights violation investigations in Sri Lanka and is 
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regarded by state actors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as a credible 
diaspora organization. As such, its involvement with international advocacy and its 
stance as a partner for peace in cooperation with state actors and key NGOs is 
noteworthy. Figure 5 shows the Global Tamil Forum’s organization. 
 
Figure 5.  Global Tamil Forum Organization75 
The mission statement of the GTF is quoted as follows: 
Our mission was shaped by the needs and priorities of the immediate 
aftermath of the war and has been driven by the need to: 
Help rebuild the lives of a community devastated by the conflict; 
Hold those responsible for alleged war crimes and crimes against 
humanity to account and ensure justice for the innocent victims of the 
conflict; and 
Facilitate international engagement for the Tamil political representatives 
from Sri Lanka to enhance the prospect of ensuring a just and lasting 
political settlement.76 
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On the GTF’s official website, the organization list its objectives. The following is a brief 
description of each objective as listed on the organization’s website: 
 The creation of an independent, international war crimes accountability 
mechanism;  
A negotiated political settlement that ends Tamil marginalization. GTF, 
along with other Diaspora groups and Tamil representatives in Sri Lanka, 
are working towards a Tamil Common Declaration, which will state the 
conditions conducive to a political settlement that addresses the 
underlying grievances of the Tamil people;  
The resettlement of IDPs [internationally displaced persons] to their places 
of origin;  
An investigation into the fate and location of persons reported to have 
been disappeared;  
The publication of a detainee database list; 
The demilitarization of Tamil areas and the restoration of complete civil 
administration to all militarized government departments and national 
institutions;  
The end of the Sinhalisation of Tamil majority areas, with immediate 
effect; 
… Engage[ment] with civil society in South of Sri Lanka, in order to 
facilitate better understanding of each communities concerns and problems 
on the island.77 
Leader Rev. Fr. S. J. Emmanuel seems to be the key figure in coordinating with 
the NGOs and leading countries to establish an effective narrative to convince moderate 
Tamils to accept the GTF’s ideology. The GTF has realized that the separatist 
movement’s relationship with India is a crucial factor since the country is a superpower, 
and over 70 million Tamils live there. The GTF has connections with United Nations 
(UN) Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, UK Prime Minister David Cameron, members of 
the African National Congress, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, and other relevant 
diplomats across the world who advocate for peacebuilding.78 The assassination of the 
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former Indian Premier Rajeev Gandhi had a negative effect on the ideology and public 
image of the LTTE.79 This political blowback forced separatist groups to take special 
precautions in creating feasible and smooth grounds in recovering their lost image by 
using a diplomatic approach with Indian higher authorities. Thereby, the GTF was under 
the impression that lobbying the 70 million members of the Tamil population in the south 
Indian region was its best course of action.  
C. BRITISH TAMILS FORUM 
The British Tamils Forum (BTF) was designated in 2006 to mobilize the diaspora 
in support of the Tamil Communal in the United Kingdom. The BTF is the largest Tamil 
diaspora organization, closely working with the Tamil community in the UK. Initially, 
the BTF’s primary intention was to help the LTTE and Sri Lankan Tamils with their 
issues. As an advocacy group, the BTF coordinated matters with British parliamentarians 
and non-governmental organizations to bring Sri Lankan issues into their agenda.80 The 
BTF’s ideologies tally closely with the TGTE’s and the GTF’s; however, its approach is 
more politically motivated than radical or extremist. The BTF’s mission statement is 
quoted as follows: 
To harness the skills and the knowledge of the members of the forum, 
well-wishers and others including the mainstream decision makers in the 
UK to alleviate the sufferings of the Tamils in the Island of Sri Lanka and 
to further their right to self-determination within the democratic frame 
work under pinned by the international law, covenants and conventions. 81 
On the BTF’s official website, the organization lists its objectives as follows: 
 To educate the British public and government personnel working on 
humanitarian, political, and economic issues regarding Tamils in Sri 
Lanka 
 To make the British public understand the injustices caused and 
discrimination against Tamils in Sri Lanka since independence 82  
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 To “enable British Tamils to advance their social and cultural well-
being”83 
Presently, the BTF is responsible for organizing various political and social 
activities designed to educate individual Tamils as well as community organizations to 
highlight perceived criminal acts against Tamils committed by the Sri Lankan military. 
This organization was significant in carrying out covert operations under the pretext of 
peace building. Another feature seen here is the BTF’s maintenance of a low profile, 
advancing the Tamil separatist agendas through democratic means.84 The group even 
went to the extent of addressing issues with higher authorities of decision-making in the 
British political forum to advance the social and cultural well-being of Tamil society in 
Britain and Sri Lanka. In 2009, a London demonstration of nearly 100,000 people was 
organized by the BTF to protest against the genocide of Tamils at the final battle against 
LTTE in Mullative, Sri Lanka. On January 31, 2014, the BTF held another conference 
focusing on land-grab issues with the participation of some speakers and international 
delegates.85 The end state of the BTF’s strategy seems to be maintaining the claim of 
human rights violations and advocating for punishing the Sri Lankan military for the 
alleged genocide of the Tamils. 
D. THE TAMIL EELAM PEOPLE’S ASSEMBLY 
In 2009, the Tamil Eelam People’s Assembly (TEPA) was formed by 
Perinbananayakam Sivaparan (known by his alias, Nediyawan), the former international 
coordinator of the International Secretariat of the LTTE based in Norway. Nediyawan 
controlled most of the LTTE assets and front organizations until the LTTE’s military 
defeat. Later, he became the unofficial head of the International Secretariat of the LTTE. 
TEPA is the strongest Tamil organization of the diaspora, particularly in Scandinavia, 
parts of Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Nediyawan’s faction is active all 
over the world and liaises with the Tamils and LTTE front organizations. TEPA also 
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plays an active role among Tamil Nadu politicians and is involved in political activities in 
India. Figure 6 shows the TEPA’s organization. 
 
 
Figure 6.  The Organization of Tamil Elam People’s Assembly86 
Nediyawan, who is carrying out Prabahakaran’s radical Tamil-homeland concept, 
opposes the TGTE’s leader, Visvanathan Rudrakumaran. TEPA’s website states, 
“Nediyawan is opposed to Tamil National Alliance. He believes that the fight for 
separatism initiated by Prabhakaran should continue. [Nediyawan is a] master in 
propaganda.”87 This statement portrays TEPA as a radical group that carries out LTTE 
ideology according to Thimpu principles as a continuation of Prabhakaran’s aggressive 
ideologies; however, TEPA’s covert network used for this purpose is currently unknown. 
Nediyawan has shown through his aggressive stance that he is very eager to become the 
sole representative of the Tamil diaspora. 
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TEPA’s main concern is to continue acquiring funding from the Tamil diaspora 
community since the LTTE’s defeat in 2009 in Sri Lanka. Nediyawan was unwilling to 
acknowledge that the leader of LTTE, Prabahakaran, was killed by the Sri Lankan 
military during the final battle between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military in May 
2009. Nediyawan is of the opinion that the declaration of Prabahakaran’s death will badly 
affect his group’s fundraising campaign, so he became a rival of the TGTE. Over this 
fundraising issue and the announcement of the formation of the TGTE by Kumararan 
Pathmanadan (KP), the chief procurer of arms for the LTTE organization, Nediyawan 
carries out strategies to hinder the TGTE’s functions and to reduce its strength. He 
continues to maintain a good relationship, however, with the GTF leader, Fr. Emmanuel. 
After the defeat of the LTTE, Nediyawan made a serious attempt to rally supporters and 
LTTE sympathizers overseas to strengthen his faction’s power and continue fundraising 
in support of his separatist goals.88 Additionally, the GTF pretends to oppose TEPA’s 
theories, but it seems that the GTF has preserved its separatist ideology and is willing to 
support other radical groups to achieve its primary objective. 
Nediyawan is responsible for launching the Tamil Television Network (TTN) a 
broadcast station that is viewable in Europe, Sri Lanka, and South India. Though the 
French government has banned the TTN, Nediyawan has managed establish new 
channels, the GTV and Madhuram. The LTTE converted the Deepam television network 
into a fundraising project. Their main concern was to spread their aggressive propaganda 
throughout Europe, Sri Lanka, and India. Pro-LTTE diaspora and Nediyawan have three 
reasons for installing these channels. The first is to work with the TNA for its goal—a 
Tamil homeland. Second, the Tamil Tigers are bent on pressuring the Sri Lankan 
government to take them off the blacklist. Third, this group is demanding a referendum 
on the North and East separation. The Canadian and Australian Tamil Congresses as well 
as the Global and British Tamil Forums support the LTTE propaganda, fundraising, and 
procurement affairs used to remove the groups from Sri Lanka’s blacklist. So many 
                                                 




international Tamil television networks have been initiated by Nediyawanto to continue 
the aggressive propaganda in Europe and elsewhere.89 It is obvious that this group also 
professes the ideology of a separate state for Tamils rather than the concept of calling 
themselves Sri Lankans.  
TEPA leader Nediyawan also coordinates with other extremist groups and 
provokes youths to carry out demonstrations against the Sinhalese population and the 
government of Sri Lanka. A few radical Tamils favor Nediyawan, whom they believe is 
the present-day LTTE leader and successor of Prabhakaran. On March 9, 2015, the Tamil 
Coordinating Committee (TCC) and Tamil Youth Organization (TYO) planned for a 
mass protest against the visit of Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena outside the 
Marlborough House head office in the Commonwealth. During this visit, the British 
prime minister, Sri Lankan president, British monarch, and representatives of the 
Commonwealth countries were scheduled to attend an evening reception at Marlborough 
House. 90 
TEPA has no faith in the government’s truth-seeking and reform processes in Sri 
Lanka and the UNHCR. In 2015, at a demonstration organized by TEPA, protesters 
expressed their anger by burning photos of TNA leader Rajavarothiam  Sampandan and 
parliamentarian Mathiaparanan Abraham Sumanthiran, who had allegedly schemed with 
the Sinhala state to undermine the Tamil National cause. Protestors claimed that the 
Sinhala-Buddhist state had not taken meaningful steps toward justice and reform for 
lasting peace. This group has felt that human rights authorities have not taken action 
toward the violation of international law between 2002 and 2011, and they are not 
satisfied with the ongoing investigation. Protestors fear that if these investigations are 
held inland, victims would have to risk their lives to give evidence. Tamil protestors 
suspect the decision to delay the UNCHR’s is meant to prevent punishment of those 
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responsible for genocide. These protestors say that the United States, as the chief sponsor 
of the original resolution, has the responsibility to ensure appropriate follow-up action.91  
On February 4, 2015, as a mark of disrespect, many Tamils gathered outside the 
PM’s office in the UK to express their anger and dislike for Independence Day, which 
they listed as a black day. They claimed that the UK was responsible for capturing the 
Tamil homeland and handing it over to the Sinhala-Buddhists of Sri Lanka for 
occupation.92 It seems that Nediyawan has made every possible attempt to undermine the 
ongoing peace process by claiming that the present government lacks the will and 
credibility to settle the ethnic problem. He has also rejected the alignment of the TNA 
with government proposals for building peace and stability among the communities in 
question. The TNA’s primary concern is still to levy total punishment for the alleged 
genocide of Tamils.  
E. LTTE HEADQUARTERS GROUP IN FRANCE   
In early 2010, the LTTE Headquarters Group was established by former LTTE 
combatants and other criminal elements (see Figure 7). During the latter part of the war in 
2009, Vinayagam, a former combatant and senior-intelligence cadre member of the 
LTTE, managed to escape and was appointed as head of this group. Vinayagam’s group 
is engaged in human smuggling operations. These criminal elements do not appear in 
public as their movements have been minimized since Interpol has issued red notices 
against them for criminal offenses. A considerable number of ex-LTTE cadres who 
escaped during the humanitarian operations with pro-LTTE activists have still been 
operating in various guises in the United States, Canada, and Europe, where a significant 
Tamil diaspora exists.93 Although the LTTE has been defeated and their top leadership 
eliminated, it seems the former international LTTE network remains active to achieve its 
separatist goals. The next section further elaborates on the activities of the Tamil diaspora 
in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. 
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Figure 7.  Organization of the LTTE Headquarters Group94 
F. THE TAMIL DIASPORA’S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, UNITED STATES, AND CANADA  
1. United Kingdom  
The majority of the Tamil diaspora resides in the United Kingdom. A recent 
census reveals that approximately 300,000 Sri Lankan Tamils live there.95 To a certain 
extent, the BTF, being the main Tamil diaspora organization in the UK, directs Europe 
and the North American efforts to achieve an independent state for the Tamils in Sri 
Lanka. Under the BTF, many Tamil sub-organizations are working with the main British 
political parties and their politicians to obtain support for their cause. A few of these 
organizations, the Tamils for Labor Party (TLP), the British Tamils Conservative Party 
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(BTC), and the British Tamils for Liberal Democratic (BTLD), support the British Labor 
Party, Conservative Party, and Liberal Democrats, respectively.96 
On September 24, 2008, a special session of the Labor Party, called “Britain in 
the World Debate,” was held by Foreign Secretary David Miliband to discuss the Sri 
Lankan Tamils’ right to self-determination in Sri Lanka. At the meeting, Miliband 
stressed that Britain had a moral duty as part of its foreign policy toward the internal 
crisis in other countries around the globe. The presence of British Secretary of State 
Douglas Alexander and Defense Secretary Des Browne was significant. The audience 
included the Honorable Peter Mandelson, senior Labor Party officials, other members of 
the British and European Parliaments, as well as business leaders. Mr. Kandaih, the 
master of ceremonies, urged the British Tamils to pass a resolution to create a condition 
for a separate state. In his speech, he also elaborated on the situation and declared, “The 
Tamil people’s right to self-determination is inevitable and essential.”97  
In February 2010, the 65,000 Sri Lankan Tamils residing in the UK cast their vote 
in favor of a separate state in Sri Lanka. The poll was organized by the Tamil National 
Council. Votes were cast in sixty-five booths in London’s major townships and cities. 
According to the final count, 64,256 voters (99.3 percent) backed the resolution while 
185 (0.29 percent) opposed it. 98 251 votes (0.3 percent) were rejected. This type of vote 
has also taken place in Norway, Netherland, France, Germany, and Switzerland. Suren 
Surendiran, the spokesperson for the BTF, confirmed the Tamils’ commitment to a 
separate state in Sri Lanka as the outcome of the polling, globally.99  
On February 24, 2010, the inaugural meeting of the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) 
was held in the UK, attended by British Foreign Secretary Miliband, Conservative Party 
Shadow Foreign Secretary William Hague, and Liberal Democratic Shadow Foreign 
Secretary Ed Davey. All dignitaries made a speech at the meeting. Representatives from 
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fourteen countries were also present in the House of Commons. Speakers included 
politicians, councilors, prospective parliamentary candidates, and some delegates. Some 
of them were invited to private meetings with Prime Minister Gordon Brown. A Buddhist 
monk and an Islamic theologian traveled from Sri Lanka to take part in the event. The 
African parliamentarian of the National Congress, Sisa Njikelana, was flown to Britain 
for only six hours, the duration of the meeting. David Miliband highly applauded the 
GTF for bringing members from 14 countries 100 and commented, “It is a reflection of the 
breadth of the Tamil Diaspora around the world, and … speaks to a unity that will serve 
the rights and hopes of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka.”101 
On October 1, 2014, members of the Conservative Party expressed support for the 
Tamil community at a reception held in the UK. In Birmingham, a reception took place at 
the Castle Fine Art Gallery during which British Conservative Party and Parliament 
members announced their support for the Tamil community. The chairman of the 
Conservative Party, British government ministers, Parliament members, and other 
policymakers participated in the session organized by the British Tamil conservatives. 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Theresa Villiers, Secretary of State for Justice 
Chris Grayling, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister of State Hugo Swire, and 
Conservative Party Chairman Grant Shapps graced this function. At this meeting, Villiers 
stated the “‘Tamil community has many friends in parliament’ and the ‘concerns of 
British Tamils are heard loud and clear.’” 102 She also expressed, “The British 
government will continue to press for justice for those thousands of Tamils who suffered, 
particularly in the final few months of the conflict.”103 Member of Parliament Robert 
Halfon, addressing the attendees, stressed his fellow lawmakers to abide by his stance 
that “Tamils have been victims of genocide and deserve the right to have their own 
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nationhood.” 104 He also stated that he is eagerly awaiting to see the establisment of a 
Tamil homeland and the acknowledgment of Tamil rights, which fulfill the diaspora’s 
goals. 
The BTF had criticized David Cameron’s pronouncement to join the 2013 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Sri Lanka. According to 
the BTF, Cameron’s decision had set a wrong precedent. A spokesman for the Queen had 
confirmed her inability to be present at this summit. This was the first time since 1973 
that a meeting of this caliber was to be held without the presence of the Head of the 
Commonwealth. The Tamil protesters carried out demonstrations that highlighted, first, 
the failure of the Sri Lankan government to implement the Lessons Learnt and 
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) adopted by the Human Rights Council in March 
2012 and, second, the categorical rejection of the UNHRC resolution (22/L.1) adopted in 
March 2013. Furthermore, the BTF devoted its efforts to demanding that Sri Lanka be 
expelled from the Commonwealth and the 2013 CHOGM be shifted to the UK to make it 
convenient for the Queen to attend. 105  
2. United States  
The TGTE had established its headquarters in the United States in May 2010 with 
the intention of setting up a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.106 The 
headquarters is located at 875 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 100, New York, New 
York.107 The TGTE had its first meeting from September 29 to October 1, 2010 at the 
United Nations Plaza Hotel in New York to frame its own constitution and elect a prime 
minister. The group observed a moment of silence to honor those who sacrificed their 
lives during the struggle for freedom. Among those who addressed the conference were 
former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Deputy Chief Minister of Penang 
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(Malaysia), Palanisamy Ramasamy, David L. Philips from Columbia University, and Ali 
Beydoun, Executive Director of Human Rights Impact Litigation Clinic on Human 
Rights Impact at Washington College of Law. This establishment had recently issued a 
war-crimes report to the United Nations. The TGTE had facilitated its members in 
London and Paris to view the conference and communicate their ideas via 
teleconference.108 
In 2008, Tamils for Obama, a political action committee of American Tamils, 
announced a fundraising event and its support for Democratic candidate Senator Barack 
Obama during his election campaign. The purpose of supporting the presidential 
candidate was to get him involved with policy changes in connection with the genocidal 
war in Sri Lanka. The organizers thought that by donating financial aid through Tamils 
for Obama’s website, politically motivated Americans would raise their voices and help 
the Tamils around the globe end the genocide of Tamils in Sri Lanka. 109 
In January 2012, Tamils for Obama sent a letter to Assistant Secretary for South 
and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake, recognizing his role and asking him to 
investigate allegations of human right abuses in Sri Lanka. He was also asked to reject 
the LLRC’s final report as partial and insufficient. The group also requested that 
Secretary Blake initiate an international investigation over the war crimes committed 
during the last humanitarian operations in Sri Lanka. 110 
On February 29, 2012, Tamils for Obama met U.S. government officials over the 
problems concerning Tamils in Sri Lanka. This meeting was held with the participation 
of Robert Blake, other State Department officials, and the assistant secretary, who were 
asked to push the matter of a self-government referendum for North and East Sri Lanka. 
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A letter was prepared by Tamils for Sri Lanka to be handed over to Blake with a copy to 
Secretary of State Clinton. 111 
On October 10, 2012, Assistant Secretary Robert Blake had a meeting with the 
Tamil diaspora regarding his September 12–14 visit to Sri Lanka. These discussions were 
aimed at Tamil communities’ concerns and brought forward a suggestion to organize a 
U.S. business delegation to be sent to Northern Sri Lanka. U.S. officials wanted to 
investigate and explore avenues of trade and investment opportunities in cooperation with 
the Sri Lankan government. A second goal was the creation of a sustainable livelihood 
for the Tamil inhabitants of Northern Sri Lanka.112 
In May 2013, the TGTE released the Tamil Eelam Freedom Charter. This charter 
was drafted with the help of Tamil groups and individuals all over the world. Famous 
freedom fighter Dr. Nuran Nabi, Mukti Bahini of Bangladesh, former Attorney General 
of the United States Ramsey Clark, and Hon. Daniel Mayan from the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement were some of the intellectuals involved in forming this charter. 
These individuals emphasized the historical importance of this freedom charter and 
pledged their support. 113 The TGTE marked May 18, 2015, the Tamil nation’s Day of 
Mourning. The TGTE announced the the Mullivaaikal Memorial Lecture Series, and 
former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark was to deliver the inaugural lecture in New 
York by invitation of the TGTE prime minister.114 
In July 2013, Tamils for Obama addressed a letter to members of both houses of 
Congress, requesting that they back a referendum on independence to North and East Sri 
                                                 
111 “Tamils for Obama Meets with Assistant Secretary Blake, Asks Blake, Clinton to Push Self-
Government Referendum in Northeastern Sri Lanka,” PRWeb, March 27, 2012, 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/3/prweb9326814.htm. 
112 “Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert O. Blake Jr. Meeting with Tamil 
diaspora,” U. S. Department of State, October 12, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/press/2012/199062.htm.diaspora 
113 “Tamil Eelam Freedom Charter Declared,” Scoop World, May 28, 2013, 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO1305/S00671/tamil-eelam-freedom-charter-declared.htm. 
114 “Sri Lanka: Former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark to deliver Mullivaaikal Memorial Lecture 




Lanka. They wrote to the president, citing a number of incidents during which Sri Lanka 
had committed genocide against the Tamils. The Tamil diaspora also urged President 
Obama to pass a resolution to push the referendum. In the letter, Tamils for Obama 
highlighted the example of South Sudan and its successful referendum for independence. 
The Tamils also requested an appointment to discuss their aspirations in Sri Lanka.115 
On July 30, 2014, the United States Political Action Committee (USTPAC) urged 
the international community to act in response to the July 1983 anti-Tamil violence in Sri 
Lanka and the subsequent denial of justice for victims. The day has been marked as an 
anniversary. USTPAC arranged religious observances with the Tamils scattered 
worldwide to commemorate this date and criticized the behavior of the Buddhist monks 
who led the violence against Tamils with the sanctions and support of the Sri Lankan 
government.116 
On October 1, 2013, the TGTE held its annual meeting under the patronage of its 
Prime Minister Vishwanadan Rudrakumaran. At the session, Rudrakumaran dissolved the 
parliament and held a new election to select his parliament members. On December 6 and 
8, 2013, during the second parliamentary term, 112 newly elected members took oaths in 
New Jersey, United States. Some of the other members had joined via video conference 
from Zurich, Switzerland. This session was telecast live on www.tgte-us.org and 
www.naathamnews.com.117 
3. Canada 
Even after the end of the struggle in 2009, many Tamil organizations in Canada 
struggled to establish a separate state called “Tamil Eelam.” Toronto has the most 
densely populated Tamil area in Canada. There are approximately 200,000 Sri Lankan 
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Tamils residing in Toronto out of a total population of 300,000 Sri Lankan Tamils in 
Canada. 118 Canadian law enforcement agencies and secret services are on the alert 
regarding the infiltration of the LTTE into their political institutions. Some Sri Lankan 
Tamils have even crept into the political parties of Canada, mainly the new Democratic 
Party as well as Liberal and Conservative parties.119 
On December 20, 2009, 99.8 percent of a 48,583-strong voting bloc managed to 
mandate the separate state concept in an election held at 31 centers in Canada. 120 The 
Canadian Tamil media units and their politicians were satisfied with the turnout, which 
was as they expected. One of the organizers said that the referendum is a favorable 
precedent for a transnational government. The Canadian Tamil media also commented 
positively. 121 
Rathika Sitsabaiesan, the first Sri Lankan Tamil candidate, secured a 
parliamentary seat in the 2011 Canadian election. Canadian authorities have observed 
that Rathika’s interest in parliament is to promote LTTE interests along with other 
nominees in Canada and overseas. Her strategy is to racialize and radicalize the 
Tamils.122 After entering parliament, she stated, “I’ve been a Tamil all my life and those 
negative stigmas on the community … we have the opportunity now to break through. … 
[W]e as a community cannot be thrown under that blanket statement. This is just another 
step in the development of the Canadian Tamil community.”123 
In September 2011, Rathika Sitsabaiesan held a well-attended viewing of Channel 
4 Documentaries’ coverage of war crimes in Sri Lanka, which was screened at Parliament 
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Hill, Ottawa. The Parliament Minister Patrick Brown of the Conservative Party, 
representative of Barrie, and the Parliament Minister John Mckay of the Liberal Party, 
representative of Scarborough-Guildwood, were at the event. Minister of Parliament 
Rathika Sitsabaiesan addressed the crowd about war crimes at the final battle and the 
responsibility of the Sri Lankan government: “I am very pleased that all parties came 
together to host this event. This issue runs deeper than political ties, and it is very 
important we all work together to raise awareness of this issue and to engage in an open 
dialogue concerning the atrocities that took place in Sri Lanka.”124 Liberal Party 
Parliament Minister John Mckay also stressed that Canada should ensure accountability. 
In addition, Parliament Minister John McKay urged Canada to ensure accountability, 
saying, “Canada is a nation that values human rights and Canada bears the responsibility 
to the 300,000 Tamil Canadians here.”125 
To coincide with these events, the LTTE front organizations in Canada appeared 
to extend their cooperation to Rathika’s nomination and election to the Canadian 
Parliament. These groups were as follows: the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam 
(TGTE), the National Council of Canadian Tamils (NCCT), the Canadian Tamil 
Congress (CTC), and the Tamil Youth Organization (TYO). United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolution 1373 has categorized these groups as terrorist organizations. 
Subsequently, Rathika has urged national spokesman David Poopalapillai and Danton 
Thurairajah of the CTC to penetrate the Canadian political system. Therefore, Camelia 
Nathaniel argues that radical parliamentarian Rathika Sitsabaiesan was responsible for 
opening the doors of the Canadian government to key members of the terrorist fronts to 
occupy appointments in the political parties.126  
On June 12, 2014, the CTC managed to nominate another three candidates for the 
provincial election in Ontario. The party ticket was offered to Neethan Shan, Ken Kirupa, 
and Shan Thayaparan, for Scarborough-Rouge-River, Scarborough-Guild Wood, and 
                                                 
124 Tamil Guardian, “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields’ Screened to Canadian MPs,” accessed February 3, 
2016. http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3568. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Nathaniel, “Canada’s Emerging Politics of Terror.” 
 46
Markham-Unionville, respectively. Camelia Nathanial has claimed that unless the 
Canadian parties and Canadians themselves take precautions to check the background of 
their applicants, nominees supported by terrorist fronts will have the capability to enter 
the parliamentary system and uphold extremism.127 
Then-Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper refused to attend the 
Commonwealth summit meeting in Sri Lanka. He threatened that Canada would suspend 
funding for the 64-year-old Commonwealth organization on the basis of human rights 
abuses by the Sri Lankan government. Hence, Harper did not attend the Colombo 
conference and refrained from sending a cabinet level representative. 128  A News East 
West article reported, “Canadian Tamil Congress national spokesman [David 
Poopalapillai] said, ‘On behalf of all Tamil Canadians, we thank our Prime Minister for 
his principled stand.’ Appealing to other Commonwealth nations to follow Canada in 
boycotting the summit, Poopalapillai said, ‘with CHOGM just a few weeks away, we 
once again urge Commonwealth members to stand in solidarity with Canada.’” 129 
Though there is a doubt over the connection between the Tamil diaspora’s 
political efforts and the re-emergence of an armed conflict in Sri Lanka, the following 
section provides evidence in three examples.  
G. THE POSSIBLE RE-EMERGENCE OF TERRORISM 
The ex-LTTE cadres who have not gone through the rehabilitation process may 
remain tied to Prabhakaran’s ideology. A few LTTE cadres who had escaped during 
humanitarian operations are suspected to be among the Tamil diaspora’s radical groups, 
those who were not rehabilitated. Records indicate that there are approximately 2,000 
LTTE cadre members remaining, comprising those who evaded arrest and were outside 
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the country without being rehabilitated. These cadres are liable to regroup and re-engage 
in an armed conflict against the state. The Sri Lankan military is on the alert to recover 
missing LTTE materiel such as ammunition, explosives, and other combat equipment. A 
danger exists wherein the remaining and overlooked LTTE cadre members have access to 
hazardous material to carry out violent, extremist acts.130 The following outlines three 
such attempts to counter or pre-empt potential LTTE attacks by the Sri Lankan military. 
1. Attempt 1: March 2012 
On March 17, 2012, a person named Muttu, belonging to the Eelam People’s 
Democratic Party (EPDP), was killed by the LTTE on the instruction of Kamalanathan 
Sadeeshkumar (alias Kumaran) who was stationed in France under the leadership of 
Vinayagam. On the arrest of a few suspects by the army, it was revealed that Kumaran 
had moved to India in November 2011. There in India, he organized a group of fifteen 
ex-LTTE cadre members to carry out strikes in Sri Lanka. However, he split these 
members into three groups and sent one team to Sri Lanka on March 6, 2012 to carry out 
assassinations in the Trincomalee district. All cadre members who came to Sri Lanka and 
were involved in the killing of Muttu were arrested, thus exposing the initial attempt 
made by the LTTE to recommence terrorist activities after the civil war.131 Today, this 
problem seems mostly international, and the chances of reconciliation within Sri Lanka 
are very remote due to the actions of overseas, LTTE-linked groups. These groups are in 
favor of separatism and on the verge of culminating armed struggles to facilitate LTTE 
objectives in Sri Lanka. 
2. Attempt 2: December 2012  
With the arrest of an ex-LTTE cadre in December 2012, security forces were able 
to illuminate an organized LTTE network functioning in India (Chennai). Further 
investigation revealed that pro-LTTE elements funded this group. Initially, six people, 
including rehabilitated female ex-LTTE, were arrested in Jaffna, and their arrests led to 
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the apprehension of four more in connection with the LTTE. In this arrest, three were 
identified as former LTTE combatants, with one person identified as an electronic expert. 
During the raid in Chennai, police were able to recover laptops, electronic circuits, cables 
and a few documents related to planned operations. A significant feature of the event was 
that these youth were carrying LTTE ideology with them. The interrogation of the 
arrested extremists revealed that the LTTE was recruiting youth with information-
technology knowledge as well as fishing experience in deep sea waters, aimed at 
conducting future operations in Sri Lanka. The arrest of the six youths involved in this 
network from Jaffna (in Sri Lanka), the raid on an LTTE safe house in Chennai (in South 
India), and the arrest of four more LTTE operatives in Tamil Nadu (also in South India) 
resulted in the dismantling of this LTTE cell.132 These incidents indicate that Tamil Nadu 
is being used as an LTTE reorganizing location. Former LTTE cadres are making 
attempts to coordinate and regroup with local elements for acts of sabotage to disrupt the 
peace process. 
3. Attempt 3: March 2014 
In March 2014, two suspects were arrested in Jaffna with handbills against 
national unity. This arrest revealed a covert LTTE operative network with the financial 
support of a foreign LTTE network in Europe. Some eighty-three suspects detained in the 
North consisted of both rehabilitated and non-rehabilitated LTTE members who had been 
found guilty of criminal offenses. Three non-rehabilitated senior LTTE members, 
Sundaralingam Kajeepan (alias Thevihan), Selvanayagam Kajeepan (alias Gobi), and 
Navaratnam Navaneethan (alias Appan), were later killed by security forces during a 
confrontation on April 11, 2014 when attempts were made to apprehend them. 
Investigations revealed that the three LTTE senior members, who were based in 
Switzerland, the UK, and India, had links to Nediyawan, Vinayagam, and the LTTE 
Headquarters Group. Out of the 83 suspects arrested, forty-seven are still detained for 
further investigation over their involvement in this latest revamping attempt. The military 
and police seized a small amount of weapons, ammunition, claymores (anti-personnel 
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mines), and three mine detectors used to identify the location of buried caches of military 
hardware. Notable throughout the operations was the cooperation of the public and the 
wealth of information the government received from the local community that enabled 
the identification of key LTTE suspects and their collaborators, which subsequently 
resulted in the death of all three key LTTE leaders in Wanni, Sri Lanka, on April 11, 
2014. 133 
Although the military movement of the separatist insurgency, the LTTE, was 
defeated in 2009, the three aforementioned incidents as well as the continued attempts of 
the Tamil diaspora strongly hint that the Tamil separatist ideology still exists. The Tamil 
homeland issue is much stronger among LTTE members living abroad who are rich and 
educated than those members who live in the suburbs with lesser privileges. Thus, global 
Tamil cadres are more interested in the creation of an independent sovereign state in Sri 
Lanka using local Tamil politics as an instrument.  
H. THE TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE 
The TNA is the leading political entity, an opposition party that represents the 
Tamil community in North and East Sri Lanka. The Tamil people are spread across the 
island, but the majority of them have historically lived in the North and East. The main 
complaint forwarded to the government through the TNA concerns the question of 
specific constitutional provisions to be adopted for the Tamil-speaking people in those 
areas. Power sharing in governance is one of the TNA’s concepts. This concept, 
according to the TNA, is not just power-sharing but sharing with special features crucial 
for the independence of the Tamil people who inhabit the island as opposed to the other 
provinces in Sri Lanka. The TNA considers of paramount importance a resolution to the 
national question of sharing the powers of governance through shared sovereignty 
between the Tamils and Sinhalese inhabiting Sri Lanka. Some of those salient features in 
                                                 




achieving genuine reconciliation and lasting peace, according to TNA,134 and principles 
are described as follows:  
 The Tamils inhabiting this island from times immemorial along with the 
Sinhalese people have their distinct culture civilization, language of their 
own heritage;  
 Northern and Eastern provinces are their historical inhabitation grounds 
with contiguous preponderantly Tamil speaking people; it is claimed; 
 It is claimed that the self-determination of rights political, economical, 
social and cultural are being enjoyed according to the United Nations 
International Covenants;  
 They propose that devolution of power based on federal structure to north 
and east; 
 Land ownership and police powers; 
 Direct foreign investment in the North-East should be allowed to create 
job opportunities.; 
 Avenues to be open for those who are unable to enter universities to 
pursue higher studies in their relevant fields to be established; 
 All that has been stated above shall be legislated and executed within the 
framework of a united Sri Lanka; 
 The Tamil-speaking Muslim people inhabiting the North and East would 
also abide by the and would be entitled as beneficiaries of power sharing 
arrangement; 
 It is proposed that comprehensive programs for development of the North 
and East in every field with the support of the government, Tamil 
Diaspora and the International community. This phenomenon was not at 
all possible to be implemented during the term of the former regime since 
the country did not have a strong and stable government. When a new 
government is established TNA is actually responsible to promote this 
issue and also to include development of Palaly as an International Airport 
and development of harbors in the North and East;  
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 The action is to be taken by TNA to renovate small tanks in the North and 
East to cater to the needs of agriculture and drinking water for its 
inhabitants.135 
The pro-LTTE local Tamil political parties that are functioning in the country still 
espouse the separatist ideology among the Tamil population in the North and East. In 
their efforts to achieve separatism, these pro-LTTE political elements inculcate hatred 
and subvert the Tamil public against the government and the Sinhalese community. 
These radical Tamil political parties carry out activities locally and internationally, aimed 
at internationalizing local issues to obtain their demands through international pressure. 
The establishment of a number of organizations sympathetic to the separatist cause also 
has been observed since the military’s defeat of the LTTE.136 Their aim is to rally around 
Tamil intellectuals, political party members, and other influential elements in the Tamil 
community, to include media elements, to achieve the separatist objective. To this end, 
statements made by certain Tamil political leaders clearly indicate their continuing 
support for a separate state of Eelam, echoing Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Mahaveer Day 
speeches calling for the establishment of Tamil Eelam. The October 13 speech of the 
TNA’s parliamentarian Sritharan in Kilinochchi also called for a separate state in Sri 
Lanka. Certain extremist Tamil voices are clearly in line with the LTTE. 137 Local Tamil 
political parties have their strongest domination in the North and East than in the other 
provinces. Considering the ability of these parties to make their voices heard in the 
legislature and other policy circles, they can be regarded as an important contributor 
toward separatist ideology.  
The TNA tries to achieve its demands indirectly based on the Prabahakaran’s 
ideology. Some of the salient features of power-sharing supposedly describe merging the 
North and East. This way, opportunities may be created for the inhabitants for their future 
development with ample resources needed for education, health, law and order, 
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employment, and other avenues for tertiary education for those left out of school and 
unable to pursue higher studies. The Tamil people have the right to self-determination, 
according to the TNA.138 The statement by the Sri Lankan foreign minister in addressing 
the 30th session of the UNHCR addresses the relevant issues and elaborates on the 
government’s stance.139  
I. THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT’S STANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS AND TAMIL ETHNIC PROBLEMS 
President M. Sirisena of the newly elected government of Sri Lanka clearly 
expresses his determination to find a lasting solution to the ethnic problem in his official 
manifesto. President Sirisena explains that he will take reasonable and accountable steps 
to solve problems that arise and address post-war commitments. He emphasizes that he is 
fully aware of the prevailing social, political, and economic crises unaddressed so far. 
According to President Sirisena, the crisis has been regressing toward an unsolvable state 
despite the military’s defeat of the LTTE. His genuine opinion in this direction is that the 
country cannot march forward without addressing these critical issues.140 
The president has taken many policy decisions to eliminate the cultural 
differences between Tamils and Sinhalese and strengthen Sri Lanka’s judicial system. In 
this context, the president has emphasized that he has taken rightful action to establish all 
necessary commissions related to the functioning of various government services, 
including the Attorney General’s department, and has deviated from the influence of 
politics. At present, these institutions have already been established and are functioning 
progressively. The other important factor that he mentions in his manifesto was granting 
freedom and reconciliation for cultural and religious institutions and consolidating the 
right of all communities to develop and secure their culture, language, and religion while 
recognizing the national Sri Lankan identity. President Sirisena points to the South 
African model as an example of reconciliation and peace building. Independence of the 
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judiciary has been regularized by appointing the Judicial Service Commission. One 
important feature is that the appointment of judges and their promotion will be based on 
seniority and merit.141 Putting words into action, President Sirirsena has appointed 
Kanagasabapathy Sripavan, a Tamil, as the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka and Rajavarothiam 
Sampanthan, also a Tamil, as the opposition leader of the present government. In 
addressing the crucial issue of human rights violations and the allegations leveled against 
the Sri Lankan government, the President has clearly said that he will take action to 
uphold a humanitarian, environment-friendly approach both locally and internationally.142 
Implementation of the reformed agenda enables Sri Lanka to achieve a meaningful 
reconciliation and good governance, which are some of the main considerations in the 
president’s manifesto. In this direction, the appointments of Rajavarothiam Sampan than 
and Kanagasabapathy Sripavan, both Tamils, sends a clear message to the world that the 
present government rejects the petty considerations of ethnicity, religion, or any other 
evaluation that would deny citizens their genuine rights in society.  
In Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera’s speech addressing the 
Human Rights Council, he emphasizes that with his victory in general elections, the 
president and the prime minister had decided to form a joint government as intended 
before the elections. The main two components of this government have been arch rivals 
for decades in the political arena. However, they have now joined in consensual politics 
to create much-needed stability in the country. This action also helps to secure a political 
settlement of the ethnic conflict.143  
The newly formed government of Sri Lanka has taken corrective steps to address 
the complaints of the Tamil people, particularly in the areas of justice, to fulfill their 
aspirations. Reconciliation is the main theme of a political settlement in the agenda. The 
rule of law that had been eroded during the past decades has been restored, credibly 
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empowering the mechanism of justice within the framework of the constitution.144 The 
establishing statute of the two mechanisms is as follows: 
 To establish a commission in consultation with the relevant authorities in 
South Africa for the reconciliation consist with religious dignitaries of all 
religions and the other is commissioner empowered. This would enable 
any perpetrators of human right abuses for whichever community to be 
brought to book and necessary action taken in the sense of justice and 
discover the truth.  
 An office is to be set up on missing persons to enable the relevant families 
to acquire the “right to know” principle according to the ICRC ordinance 
acceptable to international standards. 
 Right to justice problem is a judicial mechanism to be set up with the 
involvement of a special counsel taking to account the right of victims of 
whichever community they belong in general to be applied as a measure of 
remedy for that relevant type of offenses committed. This is mainly to 
show the society that the rule of law should be upheld at any rate.  
 This is a similar office regarding the right of victims on the right to 
reparations to be set up to go into allegations of all types of the 
implementation of the recommendations regarding truth, justice, 
reconciliation and non-recurrence as guided by the LLRC report on such 
issues.145 
The new government is considering drafting a fresh constitution to address the 
possibility of a reemergence of ethnic conflict in the future. The Paris model of human 
rights has been seen as an obvious solution in strengthening human rights considerations. 
Thereby, the previously released presidential commission reports should be forwarded for 
necessary action. Any other internationally gazetted security ordinance valid for the 
prevention of terrorism may be adopted and could call upon Sri Lankans living abroad to 
come forward to assist the government in its peace-building and reconciliation efforts.146 
The mandate given to the present government by the people of the nation on 
January 8, 2015 and repeated on August 17, 2015 clearly updates the issues for the 
Sinhalese and Tamil extremists who have failed to secure seats in parliament. This 
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journey may not be as fast as some may wish. The present mandate given to the president 
and the prime minister is quite sufficient to enable them to go ahead in finding a lasting 
solution for the prevailing issues in Sri Lanka.147  
J. CONCLUSION 
Though the roles, tasks, and policies of the TGTE, the GTF, the BTF, and TEPA 
have different wording, in their deliberations, they are each working toward the common 
goal of a separate state for Tamils in Sri Lanka. Canada, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and many countries in Europe have large migrant Tamil populations, which 
form notable voting blocs within the electoral constituencies in those countries. Although 
radicalized elements within the overall Tamil population are minimal, they are very 
active politically and capitalize on the presence of the larger Tamil diaspora to influence 
electoral politics to further their separatist goals. The GTF took a leading role in bringing 
other groups together under a common banner to create a conducive environment 
internationally to pursue the separatists. In the meantime, radicalized groups such as 
TEPA and the LTTE Headquarters Group have been actively engaged in reorganizing 
themselves for the next step in recapturing the North and East of Sri Lanka through a 
fresh struggle. The Tamil separatist insurgency, after the military defeat of the LTTE, has 
now morphed into a strategic diplomatic organization, whereby it seeks to gain 
legitimacy through international consensus and pressure on the Sri Lankan state. 
Although not physically present as militant groups within the territory of Sri Lanka, the 
insurgency still exists, albeit in ideological and diplomatic forms. Under favorable 
conditions, it has the possibility of adopting armed means as the major strategy again. 
It seems that the issue of a separate state of the Tamil-speaking people of Sri 
Lanka is the most crucial issue in the Sri Lankan government’s and Tamil diaspora’s 
agendas. The demand for a Tamil homeland has been described in different ways by 
different ideologists. The Tamil diaspora’s ideology is aligned with the LTTE 
proclamation; the only deviation is that the Tamil diaspora uses diplomacy and political 
approaches to oppose the LTTE’s military efforts. Therefore, analyzing the Tamil 
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diaspora’s political and social activities in the West and Europe, including within the 
local Tamil political parties, is critical to formulating a permanent solution to the ethnic 
problem in Sri Lanka. The end state of this effort is to achieve co-existence among all 















III. ANALYSIS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA’S POLITICAL 
SOCIAL ACTIVITIES, THE GOVERNMENT, AND 
THE TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE 
This chapter analyzes the political and social activities of the Tamil diaspora’s 
prevailing pro-LTTE organizations (the TGTE, TEPA/TNC, the GTF, the BTF, and the 
LTTE Headquarters Group in the United States, Canada, and the UK. To achieve 
sustainable peace and stability in Sri Lanka, strategists for peace should foresee the 
requirements for the settlement of the ethnic problem. Therefore, in formulating these 
strategies, the author compares and contrasts conflicting interests of the Tamil diaspora 
and the Sri Lankan government along with the TNA. Then, the author identifies the Sri 
Lankan government’s strengths and weaknesses in countering potential threats to 
sovereignty and territorial integrity and in exploiting opportunities to ensure political 
stability. The author’s conceptual model for analysis is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Adapted from Louis Kriesberg adopting conflict strategies148 and SWOT149 analysis.  
Figure 8.  Conceptual Model for Analysis  
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A. ANALYSIS: INTERESTS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA AND THE SRI 
LANKAN GOVERNMENT  
1. Complementary Interests 
Tamil diaspora communities were initially supportive of the reconciliation and 
reintegration of their ethnic community into the country’s mainstream and of the Sri 
Lankan government’s effort to implement recommendations made by the Lessons Learnt 
and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). The commission was an independent executive 
arm established to review conflict; find a meaningful, reasonable, and lasting solution to 
the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka; and promote peace building. Accordingly, since 2009, 
the Sri Lankan government has made tremendous post-conflict improvements in many 
aspects, including human rights issues. In this context, the government has been able to 
resettle 283,000 displaced civilians and to successfully rehabilitate and reintegrate 11,500 
out of the 12,000 LTTE cadre members back into society. Furthermore, the government 
has allocated 253 billion Sri Lankan rupees (LKR) to the Northern Province150 and 6.1 
billion LKR to the Eastern Province151 for infrastructure development projects.  
While both the government and Tamil diaspora agree to the reconciliation and 
reintegration process, a gray area exists. Protesters among the Tamil diaspora have 
carried out demonstrations specifically highlighting the failure of the Sri Lankan 
administration to implement the LLRC report and the absence of punitive action for 
alleged war crimes. 152 In this context, in a CNN interview, former Sri Lankan High 
Commissioner to the UK Chris Nonis said that only a small group in the Tamil diaspora 
community has leveled criticism against Sri Lanka. He further stated that these types of 
conflicts are very common to many nations, and the resolutions are either speedy or 
prolonged. He stressed the matter of the Truth Reconciliation Commissions (TRC)’s 
findings and implementation in South Africa. Similar to the TRC, the LLRC report was 
published as a matter of justifying the implementation of restorative justice but not 
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punitive action. Except for small misunderstandings on certain issues, the possibility has 
existed to sort out matters amicably through dialogue. Nonis contended the issue has been 
internationalized due to the thoughtless and shortsighted actions of a few individuals of 
the TNA and diaspora groups, who have turned the situation into a money-making 
machine. Since the majority of the wealthy, well-established Tamil diaspora lives in the 
United States, Canada, and the UK, some political leaders of those countries have 
supported them in initiating a new, more favorable inquiry.153 
Successive governments failed to build upon previous successes in the 
reconciliation and reintegration process. Former President Mahinda Rajapaksha’s 
government failed to work continuously on the effective implementation of the LLRC 
recommendations.154 These lapses on the part of the administration (2009–2015) created 
a vacuum in which the Tamil diaspora drew a mandate and blacklisted the government 
internationally. The present Sri Lankan government also failed to find a lasting solution 
to the ethnic problem.155 The current administration initiated actions to work with the 
international community, especially with the United States. The government agreed to 
appoint a new committee to find human rights violations during the war in accordance 
with a human rights commission and the UN.156 However, the present government has 
not shown improvements in implementing the commission’s recommendations. In other 
words, the inter-coordination between the ethnic group’s demands (involved in the 
conflict) and the government’s efforts seem to be in slow motion.  
The major requirement of the Tamil people in the North and East is to raise living 
standards and to ensure their wellbeing, which has been neglected for many decades due 
to the conflict. The Tamil diaspora completely failed to assist poor Tamils in this regard 
but fostered an extremist mentality among Sri Lankan expatriates. The key figures in the 
diaspora’s organizations, mainly Rudrakumaran, Emmanuel, and Nediyawan, also 
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adopted a new political strategy, which aligned with the LTTE agenda and misled local 
Tamil politicians and Tamil youth in Sri Lanka. The diaspora is still financially strong 
enough to play a leading role in assisting reconciliation and rehabilitation without 
misleading the moderate expatriates. A good example is the conversion of former LTTE 
arms procurement chief Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), who is presently performing the 
remarkable task of caring for Tamil orphans.157 Thus, the post-conflict era is the best 
period for rebuilding the Tamils’ lives in a peaceful environment. The Sri Lankan official 
authorities failed to work together with the diaspora elite and Tamil community leaders to 
get them involved with community development efforts in the war-torn areas. If the 
government had developed these positive relationships, it could have paid dividends.  
2. Conflicting Interests 
a. Interest in a Separate Tamil State in Sri Lanka  
Based on the Vaddukoddai Resolution and Thimpu principles, the Tamil diaspora 
is focused on regaining its sovereignty and right to self-determination in Sri Lanka.158 
The Tamil diaspora is actively involved in achieving its goal by funding, building 
international recognition, gaining international assistance, and conducting propaganda 
that acts as a counter to Sri Lanka’s national interests and security concerns. The Tamil 
diaspora organizations are reportedly carrying out political meetings, demonstrations, and 
various campaigns in several countries, mainly in the West and Europe to highlight that 
Tamil survival and safety are at high risk.159 Although the LTTE has been militarily 
defeated, the ideology of the Tamil homeland or a separate state in Sri Lanka remains 
unchanged among the Tamil diaspora. In the previous chapter, the author has substantial 
evidence including its behavior in various social and political activities. Among all 
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organizations of the Tamil diaspora, the common goal is achieving a separate state for 
Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
The Tamil diaspora projects its separate state ideology as a concept for justice and 
the protection of Tamil rights. The ideology of Eelam still exists in many ways under the 
guise of different themes whereby it influences the country’s political mechanism. The 
Tamil diaspora created an unprecedented amount of international pressure based on 
purported war crimes. Theses actions use as an indirect political approach to achieve the 
primary goal of a Tamil homeland. One question remains as to why diaspora 
organizations are treating Velupillai Prabahakaran as a martyr. Arguably, this is the best 
platform to market the ideology of the homeland concept. The Tamil diaspora uses the 
fierce armed struggle as an interpretation of its right to freedom. Thus, the Tamil diaspora 
tries to gain global attention, recognition, and sympathy.  
b. Discrediting the Sri Lankan Government and Its Security Forces for 
Alleged War Crimes  
The Tamil diaspora groups—the TGTE, the GTF, and the BTF—are continuously 
pressuring Western and European countries to intervene in the humanitarian situation of 
Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora created groups under various names, including 
the Tamils for Clinton, Tamils for Obama, and the Tamil Centre for Human Rights, to 
achieve their objectives. As a result of these groups’ lobbying efforts, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) proposed appointing a committee to examine 
the alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora listed the UNHCR resolution as 
a task and has strongly pursued the implementation through the international 
community.160 Rohan Gunaratna states that the Tamil diaspora has supported all the 
atrocities committed by the LTTE in Sri Lanka, including the killing of civilians, during 
the last three decades. However, with the defeat of the LTTE, Tamil diaspora 
organizations have since emerged as champions of human rights. The former LTTE 
militant Nediyawan, who succeeded Prabhakaran, is organizing these groups.161 The 
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Tamil diaspora uses allegations of human rights violations as a strategy to demand a 
Tamil homeland in North and East Sri Lanka—a trump card being exploited by the 
diaspora.  
The Sri Lankan government has failed to counter these allegations. President 
Mahinda Rajapaksha’s previous government has faced overwhelming international 
pressure stemming from these allegations. According to Gunaratna, Sri Lankan diplomats 
were not adequately educated to counter and uphold Sri Lanka’s successes in the 
reconciliation process.162 However, by rejecting the investigation proposed by the 
UNHCR, President Rajapaksha’s government created an unpleasant situation in the 
international arena. Moreover, the current administration has not forwarded a clear 
strategy to directly address alleged human rights violations, other than allowing what the 
UNHCR has recommended. Even the present government is reluctant to take remedial 
actions on human rights allegations due to tension and confusion within the Sinhalese 
community, which strongly supports the suppression of the LTTE as a terrorist 
organization. However, allegations of human rights violations are another matter, which 
could lead to further division between Sinhala and Tamil communities.  
c. The Re-emergence of the LTTE in Sri Lanka   
LTTE supporters abroad are still trying to promote the LTTE’s separatist ideology 
in Sri Lanka. Re-emergence attempts made by radical Tamil diaspora groups, as shown in 
Chapter II, corroborate this. Also, Gunaratna has stated that in the southern region of 
India, a few hundred remaining LTTE militants, sympathizers, and recently formed 
Eelam organizations created in May 1985 have recently emerged. They are involved in 
politicizing, radicalizing, and mobilizing the Tamil communities in India and 
Malaysia.163 Although Sri Lanka today is a stable country, national security is still a 
serious concern due to pro-LTTE radical groups. It is vital that the present peace not be 
taken for granted. Sri Lanka still has challenges to its vital national interests that have the 
potential for disharmony and conflict.  
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Presently, the Tamil community remains exhausted by having witnessed and 
experienced the total failure of the LTTE’s armed struggle. Therefore, the possibility of 
the LTTE or another militant group in the North and East reemerging at the same level 
would be dire; this chance is very remote, however. The racism of the Tamil people 
against the Sri Lankan majority that remains is due to the prevailing political, economic, 
security, social, and educational atmosphere in the country. However, incidents taking 
place in isolation involving ex-militants and rival factions, as well as those involving 
personal clashes, cannot be viewed as a struggle with strategic objectives in mind for 
creating a separate state. 
d. The Removal of Military Bases in the North and East  
Tamil diaspora organizations demand the withdrawal of Sri Lankan troops from 
North and East Sri Lanka. The TGTE also demands the removal of military bases to 
achieve the “freedom of the Tamil people on the basis of their fundamental political 
principles of nationhood, homeland, and right of self-determination.”164 The Tamil 
diaspora’s main concern was calling for a mechanism to fight for the land issue165 and 
removal of military bases from the North and East.166 However, on February 9, 2015, Sri 
Lankan Cabinet Minister and former LTTE militant Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan 
(alias Karuna Amman) addressed the Sri Lankan parliament and countered this military 
withdrawal from the North. The government was reluctant to withdraw military bases 
from the North because the Tamil youth had been provoked into radical activities by the 
TNA, and the Sri Lankan Navy was needed to guard against sea encroachment by South 
Indian fishermen who threatened Tamil fishermen. Muralitharan went on to say that the 
military’s presence was also required to conduct disaster relief operations for tsunamis 
and other natural disasters. He also blamed the TNA for standing with the Tamil diaspora 
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without cooperating with the legitimate government. 167 The security forces are 
responsible for the national security of the entire country. Therefore, the government 
cannot accede to the Tamil diaspora’s demand for withdrawing from military bases. 
e. The Tamil Diaspora’s Influence on the Political Stability of the Country 
The Tamil diaspora seems to be utilizing all the political authority available at 
hand to influence host countries aligning with its ideology. It has been creative enough to 
attract and profess its ideology among local and international politicians, diplomats, 
policy makers, and non-state actors who have the capacity to influence Sri Lanka.168 The 
present political, diplomatic, and security environment seems to reflect the Tamil 
diaspora’s chosen path of approach, which is non-violent yet supports the same LTTE 
ideology—a separate state. Doing so, the diaspora believes that a greater devolution of 
power could be materialized in north and East Sri Lanka, which would also facilitate 
establishing a state of Eelam through a referendum.  
The Tamil diaspora utilizes the media and the TNA to weaken the political 
stability in Sri Lanka. The Tamil diaspora along with its media network plays a critical 
role in educating and professing its ideology throughout the world, using even cyberspace 
to discredit the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) through accusations of genocide and 
war crimes, and messages to the international community.169  The Tamil diaspora also 
goes to the extent of manipulating the TNA in many ways to achieve its own internal and 
external interests. The representation of the TNA in mainstream Sri Lankan politics has 
proven very positive in consolidating and justifying the Tamil diaspora message to the 
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entire world.170 The diaspora allegedly professes the Tamil aspirations to indulge in what 
is termed a genuine Tamil political claim to the Sri Lankan government.  
B. INTERESTS OF TAMIL NATIONAL ALLIANCE AND SRI LANKAN 
GOVERNMENT 
1. Complementary Interests 
a. Developing Infrastructure in North and East Sri Lanka 
Although the government and the TNA have the same interest in developing 
infrastructure in Sri Lanka, they did not cooperate directly with each other. After 
defeating the LTTE terrorist group in 2009, the Sri Lankan government made immediate 
infrastructure development a priority through the projects, Uthuru Wasanthaya 171 and 
Nagenahira Udanaya. 172 The former government had held the view that appointing 
Major General G. A. Chandrasiri, a senior ex-military officer, as the governor 
immediately after the war would facilitate the smooth functioning of all activities while 
having extensive military support for the infrastructure development. However, the TNA 
undermined the government effort taken for development, claiming that the government 
seemed to propose military control over the North and East.173 Therefore, this situation 
disturbed the coexistence between the general public and the military, creating unwanted 
ethnic division. The TNA also criticized the government for secretly utilizing the funds 
required for the infrastructure development under its control. 
Though the government was focused on infrastructure development following the 
war, it did not take effective measures to eradicate the poverty among those who were 
most affected. The Tamils in the north and east do not have many opportunities to 
generate income other than through agriculture, fishing, and small businesses. To 
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overcome the adverse situation arising from the effects of the war, the TNA also failed to 
use the opportunity to convince and motivate the diaspora to utilize its funds to eradicate 
poverty. Due to the tug-of-war between the government and the TNA, neither addressed 
the problem of the common and poor Tamil people who were less interested in the 
concept of a separate state and self-determination. 
2. Conflicting Interests  
a. Demanding Devolution of Power 
The TNA continuously emphasized the devolution of power in Sri Lanka. 
According to the manifesto released by the TNA, “Devolution of power on the basis of 
shared sovereignty shall necessarily be over land, law and order, socio-economic 
development including health and education, resources and fiscal powers.”174 However, 
the elaboration of the facts thus outlined regarding housing, livelihood, education, 
employment does not seem to cover the entire Tamil population’s genuine requirements 
envisioned by the Tamil population in the North and East. The TNA is not going to serve 
and govern the northern peninsula in collaboration with the mainstream political parties 
of the country. The TNA today manifests somewhat closer ideologies to the LTTE and its 
diaspora.175  
Devolution of powers is a political concept; decentralization of political powers is 
the ultimate focus of this concept. This concept is not a new thing to Sri Lanka, as the 
demand for political power surfaced following independence from British rule in 
1948.176 It is unclear whether this was in fact a demand of the majority of Tamils or a 
manipulation of certain Tamil political leaders who had been subverted by politics in 
Tamil Nadu using the concept of a Tamil homeland.  
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Devolution of powers is another political trap similar to the presidential and 
provincial council systems. Once introduced and implemented in the north and east, the 
system will have to be kept for some years to see progress. The possibility of reverting 
the new system to the previous status would not be possible once it is introduced. A new 
political system would add further complexity to the already complex political landscape 
of Sri Lanka. Today, a majority of Sri Lankans do not accept either executive 
presidential177 or provincial council178 systems. They have found that both systems are 
“white elephants.” However, once political reforms have been introduced and 
implemented into the political system of Sri Lanka’s government, it may not be possible 
to abolish, review, revert from, or remove them.  
b. External Support from Tamil Diaspora Including Tamil Nadu 
The TNA’s election manifesto in the post-war period closely resembles the 
LTTE’s ideology in the pre-war period. The TNA manifesto is based on the Vaddukodai 
Resolution and aligns with the TGTE’s and GTF’s Tamil ideology. The Tamil diaspora 
depends totally on the TNA to profess its ideology, yet the TNA has no bearing 
whatsoever on the actual grievances of Tamils in Sri Lanka.179 For this reason, the TGTE 
and the GTF refer to the TNA as the sole representative of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. 
Conversely, the TNA depends completely on the diaspora to fund its political campaign. 
Hence, the Tamil diaspora presses its iron fist over the TNA, and the TNA in turn would 
do anything to satisfy the Tamil diaspora.  
The TNA alignment with the Tamil diaspora and Tamil Nadu with regard to the 
internal political problems creates further distrust within the government and the Sinhala 
community. The possibility of expatriates who have already migrated to foreign countries 
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returning to Sri Lanka to settle down for good is very remote. Also, these situations 
cannot be compared to the situation in Sri Lanka since there is a vast difference between 
the cultural and political systems in India and Tamil Nadu. Therefore, the TNA has to 
work in close collaboration with the existing government of Sri Lanka. There are enough 
examples in the outside world wherein external involvement in the internal problems of a 
country go unsolved and further complicate problems. During the past three decades, the 
Tamil diaspora and India have both supported the LTTE to fight a prolonged war. In the 
end, however, no substantial gain.  
c. Removing Security Forces from the North and East 
As with the Tamil diaspora, the TNA is also trying to remove security forces from 
the North and East. Therefore, the same analysis is relevant to the TNA. The author does 
not analyze the same under the TNA’s conflicting interest.  
C. INTERESTS OF GOVERNMENT  
1. Complementary Interests 
a. Securing a Political Settlement of the Ethnic Conflict 
For the first time in the history of Sri Lankan politics, the United National Party 
(UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), formerly staunch rivals, have united to 
form a consensus government under the leadership of the President Sirisena and Prime 
Minister Ranil Wickramasignhe.180 This main amalgamation of the two political parties 
will also help the government arrive at a political settlement on the prevailing ethnic 
issue. Mangala Samaraweera in his inaugural speech at the Human Rights Council 
emphasized the need for confidence building as the most crucial and important potential 
for the people of the nation affected by the conflict. By winning the last general election, 
the United National Front created a favorable environment for accelerating its political 
agenda. This collaboration seems to be a new culture of Sri Lankan politics. That the new 
government defeated the extremists on both sides who were separated can be thought of 
as a reward for the moderates in parliament.  
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The ethnic issue is a politically created one because of bad or weak governance. 
Apart from the ethnic issue, another two insurgencies came into being in 1971 and during 
1987–89 along with a separatist conflict due to bad governance in the country.181 Since 
1948, three complex political systems have existed that have not taken responsibility and 
accountability for the situations.182 All three political systems worked in isolation. 
Hence, the pattern of thinking among individual groups has been in disarray. Since 
independence, Sri Lanka has not shown any progressive signs in human development. 
The vast volume of migration at different waves in the history is but one example.  
The military defeat of the LTTE was not the end of the ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka. Those who exploited the situation have demonstrated to the world that this is an 
ethnic crisis that must ultimately be solved by political means. Both Sinhala and Tamil 
political parties seem to take undue advantage of the political situation and agitate people 
of both communities based on separatism. The Sinhala parties who need power through a 
political majority say that any devolution of power would lead to separatism. Conversely, 
the Tamil parties who anticipate a majority say that power-sharing with a Sinhalese 
majority government would deprive them of their right to exist.  
Also, due to the complexity of governance, people have become more racially and 
religiously oriented. The devolution of powers would not only create further disharmony 
but also lead to fresh bloodshed in different forms as shown in Sri Lanka’s history; the 
possibility of future civil or ethnic clashes certainly exists. Agitated Sinhala extremists 
would try to chase the Tamil communities from areas where the majority of Sinhalese 
live. These clashes may even extend to Muslim-populated areas in the North as well if 
any homeland concept is felt.  
It is necessary to grant equal rights and a feasible livelihood to the people of the 
north and east. It does not mean that the Sri Lankan government should simply introduce 
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a devolution of power similar to that which has been practiced by other countries like 
India due to outside interference. Also, Tamil politicians and self-serving people have 
tried to manipulate the majority of poor Tamils, exploiting their fear that the government 
is not interested in alleviating their poverty but rather in controlling their behavior. There 
is the possibility of granting judicial, land, and police powers to the province, which the 
central government has the capacity to overrule at any time. Since independence, all 
successive governments have been reluctant to dilute authority due to the mistrust that 
has existed for so many decades. The government suspects that the devolution of such 
powers will lead to the establishment of a separate state as envisioned by the Tamil 
diaspora.  
b. A Continuation of Recommendations Made by the LLRC 
President Sirisena in his manifesto pointed out that he will use the South African 
model as an example of reconciliation and peace building. Accordingly, the government 
has stated that it plans to set up a commission in consultation with appropriate authorities 
in South Africa regarding justice reconciliation and non-recurrence of issues. However, 
the South African High Commissioner in Sri Lanka Geoff Doidge states that “Sri Lanka 
should adopt a home-grown solution to the ethnic issue as the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) of South Africa cannot be replicated anywhere else in the world.”183 
The crisis in Sri Lanka is far too complex and rooted in the history than the South African 
situation. Also, other outside agencies do not have the ability to understand the internal 
affairs and problems existing in Sri Lanka. Therefore, Sri Lankan authorities must arrive 
at a solution rather than try to seek outside interference and mediation. 
D. EXISTING STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND 
THREATS FOR THE SRI LANKAN GOVERNMENT  
The following analysis explores the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats (SWOT) for the Sri Lankan government as it works to obtain lasting peace.  
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1. Strengths 
The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) have 
joined to form a single governing group in Parliament, thus creating a two-thirds majority 
for the governing side. This power enables the government to come to a consensus about 
matters of interest. Also, there is multi-party, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious 
representation in the Parliament, which includes Tamils. This representation allows for a 
good formulation of many different segments of the society. This coalition will help 
eradicate political extremism and rivalry between political parties.  
The positive diplomatic relationships between Western and European countries 
and the image created by the government through successful infrastructure development 
in the North and East will be favorable in resolving the ethnic problem. Normalcy during 
the post-conflict period has added credibility to the governing authorities as an indicator 
of stability within the country. Furthermore, after 2015, Sri Lanka’s present government 
has been able to build up positive and fresh relations with Western and European 
countries in addition to India. This relationship ensures Western support in international 
forums and matters arising before the UN Security Council that threaten Sri Lanka’s 
national interests. 
Devolution of power and due recognition of the Tamils will facilitate an amicable 
solution to overcome mistrust and discrimination. Establishment of the Northern 
Provincial Council completed one of the much-debated requirements of the 13th 
Amendment to the Constitution. This authority itself poses as a good response to 
allegations against the political authorities for not fully implementing the amendment. 
Additionally, the government has given due recognition to the Tamil National Alliance 
by appointing Rajavarothiam Sampanthan as the leader of the opposition in the present 
government. The appointment of Kanagasabapathy Sripavan as the Chief Justice of Sri 
Lanka is another critical decision to prove the implementation of justice.  
2. Weaknesses 
The requirement for a long-term and sustainable policy is necessary for finding 
solutions to the ethnic problem prevailing in Sri Lanka. No government in the past or 
 72
present has thought of solving this problem as a matter of priority. Frequent changes to 
the system and its policies have not allowed for the establishment and development of a 
positive relationship between ethnicities in Sri Lanka. The political authorities have not 
shown the ability to completely win the hearts and minds of the Tamil population in the 
North and East after defeating the LTTE in 2009. This inaction deprived the Tamils of 
their political power in the Northern Provincial Council. 
President Rajapaksa’s administration has not shown the ability to cultivate 
positive relations with Western and European countries to manage the existing issues 
with the Tamil diaspora diplomatically. Furthermore, the Sri Lankan government has 
failed to counter allegations of war crimes or coordinate with the UNHCR to investigate 
these allegations. The previous administration faced overwhelming international pressure 
stemming from these allegations. These misjudgments have compounded the allegations 
leveled by the Tamil diaspora. This negligence of remedial action has further increased 
tensions. 
Political authorities have not been able to fully resettle the Sinhala and Muslim 
communities who fled from the North and East during the war. This seemed to deprive 
the ethnic Tamils who had lived in the North throughout the war an opportunity to 
understand the Sinhalese and Muslim communities through living with them. This 
situation created an unwanted division among the ethnic groups by depriving them of 
their opportunity to coexist as Sri Lankans. This segregation will have an adverse effect 
on the country’s future stability and territorial integrity. Also, Sri Lanka has recently seen 
the emergence of political, religious, and ethnic extremist groups within the country. This 
has created an environment of suspicion and uneasiness among different ethnic and 
religious groups.  
The absence of a strong diplomatic capability to voice Sri Lankan opinions 
internationally regarding Tamil ethnic separatism in Sri Lanka remains a failure to date. 
The government’s counterpropaganda mechanism has not shown good results from the 
inception of the war until now. The Tamil diaspora has taken advantage of this failure 
and exploited the allegations to achieve the objective of a Tamil homeland. This 
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weakness has created an unfavorable situation for the government of Sri Lanka in forums 
in which this matter is discussed internationally.  
The government has failed to amend the present constitution of the provincial 
council system (the 13th Amendment) that includes police and land powers. This 
provision has created space for any political party with separatist ideologies to influence 
the law and order a framework for the country if it comes into power in any provincial 
council. The presence of Sinhala extremist groups opposing the peace movement in the 
Parliament is creating an environment whereby they misinterpret all movements for a 
political settlement. 
3. Opportunities 
Establishment of the Northern Provincial Council with the TNA in power has 
created a positive relationship for peaceful political negotiation. Devolution of power can 
be used to eradicate separatist ideology to function under the constitutional framework of 
the country. This, in turn, provides the government with an opportunity to execute 
government policies through the Northern Provincial Council authorities, to act on legal 
grounds, and to punish any offenders for attempts at breaching the constitutional 
provisions. 
The rise of extremist elements in the world has raised the awareness of major 
powers in devising ways and means to fight these elements. Sri Lanka’s fight against 
separatism and attempts to prevent the reemergence of terrorism within the country can 
also be interpreted within this broad framework. As a result, there is an opportunity for 
the country to gain support from major powers for the Tamil diaspora’s radical activities. 
For example, the U.S. policy on the war against terror paved the way to cut off the LTTE 
and diaspora relationship during the conflict. 
The end of the war has created an opportunity to recruit more individuals from 
minority groups into the military. This recruitment creates the environment to have more 
diversity in the military and to be rid of the popular reference to the Sri Lankan military 
by some parties as a totally “Sinhalese” military. Presently, the Tamils consider military 
deployment in the North and East as an intruding element. The Tamils in the North do 
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not think of the existing threat of the Tamil Nadu as an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
to Tamil fishermen’s limited opportunities.  
The Tamil diaspora and the TNA are interested in developing the North and East. 
The government is not in a position to manage the situation in terms of their grievances. 
The eradication of poverty and creation of income generating systems are of paramount 
importance. Obtaining assistance from the Tamil diaspora for infrastructure development 
and rehabilitation projects for the North and East is essential. The Tamil diaspora has 
given financial support to the LTTE to fight against the government. Now the opportunity 
has come to divert those funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation process in the 
North and East.  
4. Threats 
Although the LTTE was militarily defeated, the ideology of a Tamil homeland or 
separate state in Sri Lanka remains unchanged. This is a great drawback and has to be 
addressed through proper channels; otherwise, the threat to the government will not ease 
as anticipated. The diaspora radical groups have made many attempts to revive the LTTE 
insurgency in Sri Lanka. This would adversely affect the smooth functioning of the 
development and reconciliation process. Also, these attempts would create an 
unnecessary disturbance for the Tamils in the country who do not anticipate a re-
emergence of the LTTE violence. 
The Tamil diaspora accused the Sri Lankan state and military of alleged genocide 
against the Tamils, mainly in the latter stages of the war. These allegations could result in 
unfavorable conditions for the co-existence of Sinhalese and Tamils living in the country. 
The pro-separatist diaspora’s activities and the relations it has established with the West 
pose the gravest political and diplomatic threat to the country at present. These relations 
with the West make it easy for them to discredit the Sri Lankan government and gain the 
sympathy of powerful countries for their cause. 
The threat to the existence of military bases in the North and East would endanger 
national security and create an unfavorable situation to the whole country. This would 
also facilitate the fear of a re-emerging LTTE-type of threat and declaration of a separate 
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state. Conversely, the presence of a hostile provincial government in Tamil Nadu poses a 
threat in the post-war era. The distance from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka is small—54 km. 
Also, sympathizers in Tamil Nadu share many things with the pro-separatist Tamil ethnic 
elements within Sri Lanka, including language and the religion. This relationship with 
Tamil Nadu greatly influences the position of separatists against the Sri Lankan 
government.  
The present socio-political system causes the public to be increasingly insensitive 
to threats to Sri Lankan national security and to focus primarily on routine needs for 
survival. This insensitivity of the public is also a threat to peace as it makes it easy for 
external interest parties to easily influence its thinking. Also, Western and European 
powers hostile to Sri Lanka have the ability to initiate action against the government in 
response to allegations made by pro-separatists groups while turning a blind eye to 
similar actions by friendly nations. Sri Lanka’s status as a less wealthy developing 
country has little sway in the international arena; the presence of a hostile West is a 
threat. 
E. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
FROM POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES OF PRO-LTTE 
MEMBERS OF THE TAMIL DIASPORA 
1. Positive Impacts 
The diaspora is incredibly wealthy and well settled in primarily rich countries all 
over the world. Hence, its investments and services may be of paramount importance in 
developing of North and East and eradicating the poverty of the rural folks inhabiting the 
region.  
2. Negative Impacts 
Finding a political settlement to the problem that would be acceptable to both the 
Tamil minority and Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka is of paramount importance. 
However, the interference of the Tamil diaspora with the same ideology as the LTTE, a 
Tamil homeland or a Separate State in Sri Lanka creates an unfavorable situation for 
finding a lasting solution to the ethnic problem. 
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The willful negative interference of the diaspora in the domestic affairs of the 
country causes an interruption for the present conditions of peaceful co-existence of the 
citizens of Sri Lanka. 
The pro-separatist Tamil diaspora and its positive relationship with the West and 
Europe pose the gravest political and diplomatic threat to Sri Lanka at present and 
discredit to the government in the international arena. 
The TNA, although a part of the governing process in the Sri Lankan 
administration, controls and directs its activities according to the Tamil diaspora’s 
agenda. Therefore, this interference creates an unhealthy relationship with the other 
political parties.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Since the military’s defeat of the LTTE in 2009, the Tamil diaspora has remained 
and is still active as well as highly influential. The Tamil diaspora groups have enhanced 
their attempts through the organizations (the TGTE, TEPA/TNC, the GTF, the BTF, and 
the ex-combatant/intelligence group) of the LTTE to achieve similar goals to the LTTE’s. 
The Sri Lankan government faces more conflicting than complementary sentiments from 
the Tamil diaspora organizations concerning national security, sovereignty, and integrity. 
First, the diaspora organizations are still influencing the international community to 
pressure Sri Lanka in many ways with a view of having a separate homeland within Sri 
Lanka. Second, the radical groups—TEPA and the ex-combatant/intelligence group of 
the LTTE—are interested in the reviving their separatist ideology in Sri Lanka. Third, 
they influenced the UNHCR to adopt a resolution calling for an international examination 
into purported war crimes in Sri Lanka and thereby discrediting the Sri Lankan 
government and the military. Also, the TNA, being the main Tamil political 
representative in the Sri Lankan government, is working on the same agenda as that of 
the Tamil diaspora. However, the previous and present governments have failed to 
establish a credible link with the Tamil diaspora and to effectively address the Tamil 
community’s grievances in Sri Lanka. Therefore, considering the positive and negative 
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impacts of the Tamil diaspora’s political and social activities, I provide recommendations 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION  
A. CONCLUSION 
The military’s defeat of the LTTE in 2009 does not seem to be the end of the 
ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. A political solution is still necessary to address the core 
issues of this problem in the country. The government needs to look at this issue 
humanely to arrive at a reasonable solution. However, the government’s biggest 
challenge is to ensure the mutual coexistence of different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. A 
psychological change within the affected people has become the main issue for the 
behavior of the Sri Lankan population. It is a continuous process and will be different 
from a solution that is used to settle everyday problems. However, there can be no real 
final, lasting solution, since lasting solutions can often create other problems. The current 
situation following the defeat of the LTTE must be taken into consideration. Sri Lanka 
defeated the LTTE to find a solution to the ethnic problem.  
The Tamil diaspora’s social and political activities have a direct impact on the 
search for a solution to the ethnic problem. Continued attempts of the Tamil diaspora to 
resurrect a Tamil insurgency strongly indicate that Tamil separatist ideology still exists. 
The idea of a mono-ethnic Tamil homeland is much stronger among wealthy and 
educated global Tamils than among those living in Sri Lanka. Ironically, it is the global 
Tamils who seek to establish a mono-ethnic homeland in Sri Lanka, using local Tamil 
politics as an instrument. The TGTE, the GTF, and the BTF’s actions are used as indirect 
political approaches to achieve their primary goal of a Tamil homeland. Their ideology 
calls for a distinctive approach to understand the problem. 
TEPA and the ex-combatant/intelligence groups are seen adhering to radical ideas 
of a reemerging LTTE insurgency. They resort to acts of violence as a solution to the 
ethnic problem. These Tamil diaspora groups access the local Tamil population, 
especially ex-combatants, with the motive of a common Tamil homeland. The 
government must handle these situations carefully to avoid the blunders made in 1983. 
The government should take action to make the majority Sinhalese understand that this 
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method of violence is not the perception of all Tamils in Sri Lanka. There is a need to 
identify the radical groups’ efforts and instead of using coercive force. The government 
needs to adopt peaceful methods to avoid any recurrence of spiraling violence. A wide-
ranging contact with the leaders of the minorities must be undertaken by the government 
to alleviate any fears of threats.  
Presently, the UNHCR resolution on alleged war crimes by the Sri Lankan 
military is a major issue among the diaspora. The Tamil diaspora is capitalizing on this 
issue, especially in the United States, Canada, and the UK to discredit the Sri Lankan 
government and military. Former President Rajapaksa’s administration failed to 
effectively handle the problem from its inception. The Tamil diaspora gained an 
advantage over these alleged war crimes to market its “referendum” for a separate state 
ideology to the world. The present government has done little to address the issue in the 
countries where the Tamil diaspora plays a prominent role. The government should 
positively face the allegations rather than avoiding them.  
Internally, another major challenge for the government has been to deal with the 
TNA to find a solution for the Tamil issue without further disturbing the coexistence 
between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities. The Tamil diaspora is manipulating the 
TNA for its own interest to achieve its internal and external goals. The representation of 
the TNA in the mainstream politics of Sri Lanka has become a blessing in disguise for the 
diaspora to speak to the world about the alleged malpractices caused by the government. 
The Tamil diaspora is disingenuous in professing its ideology as the Tamil people’s 
aspiration. Conversely, the Tamil diaspora and the TNA have not given priority to 
addressing the immediate requirements of the Tamil people in the North and East.  
Since independence in 1948, all successive governments have failed to find a 
genuine solution to the demands of the Tamil community. Devolution of power for 
balanced economic growth in the North and South is very critical. Reducing the military 
presence vis-à-vis security issues in the South and the East needs a careful approach. As 
such, the government needs to formulate a comprehensive national security strategy that 
encompasses economic affairs, external affairs, security, and internal law and order. 
Furthermore, the government needs to prioritize establishment of an independent 
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commission and devolution of power. The ethnic problem must be identified as a priority 
to maintain peace and harmony in Sri Lanka.  
The aforementioned concerns related to Sri Lankan national security encompass a 
number of challenges the state needs to address, especially in the post-conflict scenario to 
ensure sustainable peace. The government should understand that side-lining the diaspora 
will not help the country solve the internal problem. Furthermore, the government’s 
grand strategy in the post-conflict scenario is also based on the security strategy. The 
government should encourage all ethnic groups to think as one Sri Lankan nation, 
deviating from party politics to function in a healthy and smooth atmosphere for uplifting 
coexistence. In order to achieve a more permanent peace, the idea of a Sri Lankan 
national identity must be inculcated into the hearts and minds of children in all 
communities within the country. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Political and Diplomatic 
First and foremost, Sri Lanka has to ensure the co-existence of Sinhala, Tamil, 
and Muslim communities in the country. The eradication of mistrust prior to finding a 
political solution is a must. Under Sri Lanka’s current circumstances, political leaders 
should take necessary action to genuinely address the Tamil community’s grievances. 
The TNA should cooperate with the government to ensure the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Sri Lanka without developing further mistrust. The government, in turn, must 
ensure the rule of law and good governance through transparency, equal sharing of power 
and zero tolerance toward ethnic discrimination at government or non-government levels. 
Democracy must be practiced at every level with the strict implementation of law. The 
government must also consider enacting strong laws against ethnic violence and ensure 
smooth information flow from the government to the public to prevent adverse 
propaganda that could disrupt communal harmony. 
The Sri Lankan government needs to establish a special task force to negotiate 
with the diaspora. The task force should cooperate with diplomatic missions to create a 
dialogue with both Tamil diasporic elements and Western policy makers. To achieve this 
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strategy, the task force together with the Sri Lankan foreign missions is necessary to 
carry out continuous public diplomacy campaigns to discredit Tamil diaspora’s negative 
propaganda operations and disturb its separatist agenda. By highlighting the living 
standard of poor Tamils, the Tamil diaspora can contribute to rehabilitation processes in 
North and East Sri Lanka. The ethnic issue in Sri Lanka is a historical one, and the Sri 
Lankan Tamil issue has its own characteristics that are not to be found in any other part 
of the world. If the Tamil in Sri Lanka were granted a separatist state, the decision would 
worsen the situation, with more bloodshed than the three-decade conflict. Therefore, the 
Sri Lankan government should find suitable ways and means to evolve a viable strategy 
to address the homeland concept while dealing with the diaspora. First, it must dissuade 
the diaspora from the concept of separate homeland, and second, it must persuade an 
alternative concept whereby the Tamils would politically, economically, socially, and 
educationally enjoy the same rights and benefits as the other citizens. 
The Sri Lankan government must ensure communal harmony through an accepted 
level of power devolution and through close ties with both the TNA and the Muslim 
Congress. This study recommends that implementing the existing provincial council 
system is in accordance with the 13th amendment which should be employed rather than 
introducing a new federal system. As explained in Chapter III, introducing a new system 
would further complicate the situation. It is unclear as to whether the devolution of power 
should be considered a solution for the North and East; an investigation of this option is 
in order. However, if the Sri Lankan government proposed a political solution that would 
meet the Tamils’ homeland aspirations, the Tamil diaspora might be able to change its 
present stance. Also, a new multi-level (political, economic, educational, social, and 
psychological) strategy is vital to addressing the root causes that led to an ethnic problem 
that had a separatist concept as a solution. 
To facilitate this strategy, the government needs to coordinate with Western and 
European countries to receive assistance in stopping Tamil diaspora activities that have 
negative impacts on achieving sustainable peace. Maintaining healthy and cordial 
relationships both in economics and political terms with the West and Europe plays a 
critical role in the international relations of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s relationship with the 
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West and European countries needs to be improved by productive diplomatic dialogues 
that are notdisrupted by the Tamil diaspora’s allegations.  
The government should preserve the freedom of assembly for Tamils to 
demonstrate their grievances. Implementation of this freedom would involve ensuring 
that legal gatherings, demonstrations, and processions take place peacefully. The Sri 
Lankan authorities have not been very concerned in this regard, neither militarily nor 
diplomatically. They have, therefore, paid the price for overreactions that in most cases 
could have been very minor incidents. Deficiency in this aspect has led to the failure of 
the government and security forces to win the hearts and minds of the Tamil population 
at large. 
2. Information and Technology 
The government has to be aware of constantly changing situations and, when 
necessary, respond appropriately to new developments. To obtain public support for a 
political strategy, the government must convince the people that their aspirations will be 
totally addressed. To establish security and to achieve a national consensus, some of the 
criteria include: creating political and economic stability, countering extremism, and 
meeting external challenges. However, the government should not sideline the national 
vision of achieving the twin objective of sustaining development and reconciliation. 
Because Sri Lanka is divided politically by ethnicity, the government needs to 
conduct a campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Tamils. Even though most citizens 
understand that racism as well as ethnic and religious division should be eradicated, the 
government still needs to work with extremist groups among all ethnicities to prevent 
conflict and bring peace to the country. 
The government needs to counter the Tamil diaspora’s cyber and propaganda 
campaigns. Information and cyber-security in a modern networking environment is an 
essential requirement for all countries. This situation is increasingly complex due to new 
security threats from social media sites. Establishing a new cyber security policy and 
enforcing organization are crucial requirements to secure and effectively utilize 
information technology in Sri Lanka. 
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3. Military 
The government should cut off existing threats from Tamil Nadu, especially the 
radical groups who have made attempts to re-start the LTTE in Sri Lanka (three 
prominent incidents have been detailed in Chapter III). The Tamil-populated Indian 
province of Tamil Nadu is likely to remain a source of concern for a renewed separatist 
movement. The government needs to increase the utilization of the Navy and Coast 
Guard in a border-protection role to the Sri Lankan EEZ, especially in the North and 
East, which should help mitigate the threat of pro-LTTE elements infiltrating from waters 
off Tamil Nadu. The Army must also be deployed to cover coastal areas that are not 
covered by naval elements to resist illegal access via sea, and the Air Force has to 
develop its capabilities in surveillance.  
The government must develop a civil–military secret service type organization to 
gather, process, analyze information both locally and overseas, and feed this analysis to 
the state leadership for necessary action. The secret service also needs to develop and 
integrate a national-level intelligence policy with foreign agencies. The Sri Lankan 
government has the option to double its intelligence strength, especially in the conflict 
zones of the past. Had it done so previously, the military would have defeated the LTTE 
movement at its early stages, before it could grow to such dangerous levels. Future 
threats of insurgency can likely be defeated. In a previous work, this author argues that it 
is vital to “build a common intelligence database, conduct joint training,”184 and share 
technology, expertise, and experience. Extensive training and awareness programs should 
be carried out to counter the separatist ideology. Identification of resistance networks is 
another important factor in this regard. All training should be diverted to effectively 
harnessing the skills of individuals to face strategic situations at any level and at any 
moment in the future. The coordination of friendly foreign nations would be helpful in 
building intelligence networks in their design and research.  
The government must recruit Tamils into the military and, particularly, into the 
police department to give them due recognition as part of the security system of the state. 
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This integration will also help in the reconciliation program. All efforts must be made to 
reintegrate the Tamil ethnic minority back into the national fold. This will help the 
government eliminate the Tamils’ mistrust and negative impression toward the security 
forces. Since the Tamil minority is part and parcel of the nation as a whole, this ethnic 
group should not be treated as outsiders but should be given responsibility for the 
nation’s safety. As responsible citizens of the country, they should be called upon to hold 
the responsibility of nation-building, along with the rest of the other ethnic groups 
including the majority Sinhalese. This action is a feasible solution for creating a positive 
impression of the Sri Lankan military. This remedy for social integration would also be 
recognized internationally as components essential for a successful and a well-reformed 
nation.  
Since there is no longer imminent threat from LTTE, the government should take 
appropriate action to release private land to the original owners. The government should 
redeploy forces island-wide based on a strategic appreciation of the present threat. The 
security forces should hold strategically important places only. Otherwise, the pre-
positioning of the military in large strengths in the North and East would lead to 
acquiring the lands of civil personnel and properties under military control. It also would 
disturb the freedom of the communities in the area. Furthermore, the TNA and other pro-
LTTE sympathizers, both local and foreign, would likely exploit this situation for social 
and ethnic propaganda. To address this, the military forces should be re-positioned in the 
cantonments without completely de-militarizing the area. 
4. Economy 
The Sri Lankan government should improve economic conditions and job 
opportunities in the Tamil areas. It is highly necessary to maintain internal peace and 
stability through economic development of the country by ensuring social security. The 
government has to initiate a plan to uplift the living standard of the poor Tamil people to 
at least a lower middle-class level. Thus, recommended education and training areas are 
of paramount importance to reach such a social level. Simultaneously, the government 
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should take appropriate actions to reopen factories and other industries closed due to the 
conflict.  
The government should encourage wealthy members of the Tamil diaspora to 
invest in major projects in the North and East of the country. The government should give 
priority and high preference to Tamil investors. This effort should be strengthened by the 
use of skillful diplomacy. In this context, the Sri Lankan diplomatic mission abroad 
pursues realistic and effective diplomatic goals to enhance relationships between both 
host countries and the Tamil diaspora.  
C. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is necessary to identify the different groups of the Tamil diaspora based on their 
ideas of the ethnic problem and its solution. There are about 1,506,000 Sri Lankan Tamils 
spread across the world; nearly half of them reside in the United States, Canada, and the 
UK.185 However, not all the Sri Lankan Tamils can be categorized as pro-LTTE Tamil 
diaspora, supporting the idea of a separate state in Sri Lanka. In the 2010 elections, only 
65,000 out of 300,000 people voted during the poll organized by the Tamil National 
Council in the UK. According to the Tamil National Council, only 185 (0.29 percent) 
opposed creating a separate state in Sri Lanka.186 Future research should focus on 
identifying the opinions of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora residing all over the world, 
particularly in Canada, the UK, and the United States, regarding its views concerning 
Tamil statehood (mainly a pro-LTTE concern). 
There is an avenue to study aspects of the Tamil diaspora network. Any attempt to 
counter the Tamil diaspora organizations’ threat to Sri Lankan stability in the present day 
context requires a systematic approach for understanding their interconnectedness. Also, 
the identification of Tamil diaspora organizations’ links across people and institutions on 
a global level is of paramount importance to identify and counter the different threats to 
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Sri Lanka. A broader understanding of the Tamil diaspora’s involvement will impart a 
deeper insight into its modus operandi and, therefore, uncover ways of effectively pre-
empting and disabling such networks.  
There is a potential threat to Sri Lankan and Canadian political stability from 
radical Tamil parliamentarians in Canada. There are approximately 300,000 Sri Lankan 
Tamils living in Toronto and its suburbs.187 Based on Sri Lanka’s past, the situation in 
Toronto may be of concern. With the growth of the Tamil diaspora in Canada, the 
political situation between the diaspora and Sri Lanka becomes complicated due to its 
transnational character.188 Radical Tamil parliamentarians were responsible for opening 
the doors of parliament to key leaders of terrorist fronts and allowing them to lobby 
political parties and politicians. 189 Therefore, a study is needed to analyze the Tamil 
diaspora’s behavior in Canada and its capability to enter office in Canada’s parliament to 
promote extremism that could create an unstable situation in Sri Lanka and Canada.  
                                                 
187 Nathaniel, “Canada’s Emerging Politics of Terror.” 
188 Amarnath Amarasingam, “The Tamil Community in Canada: A Brief Overview,” Tamil Culture, 
January 2, 2014, http://tamilculture.com/the-tamil-community-in-canada-a-brief-overview/. 
189 Nathaniel, “Canada’s Emerging Politics of Terror.” 
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